Limitation of Actions Consultation - Law Commission

94; the Vaccine Damages Payments Act 1979, section 3; the Compulsory
Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981, section 10; the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988, sections 113 and 203. We would also ask
consultees for their views as to whether there are other limitation periods
in other statutes that ought to be brought within the core regime.
19. A “SWEEPING-UP” OR “DEFAULT” PROVISION?
13.185 Should our core regime extend to all other causes of action that we have not so far
dealt with in our provisional recommendations? In other words, should there be a
“sweeping-up” or, as one might otherwise term it, a “default” provision according
to which the core regime should apply unless specifically excluded? Such an
approach would have the merit of rendering the drafting of a new Limitation Bill
easier in that it would not be essential to draw up a comprehensive list of actions
falling within the ambit of the core regime. A ‘sweeping-up’ clause would also
mean, for example, that for the purpose of the law on limitation, there would be no
need to determine whether ‘bailment’ is a cause of action separate from an action
in tort, contract or restitution. 259
13.186 But the major practical consequence of such a provision would be that those few
causes of action for which there is no statutory limitation period - and which
would not be covered by any other of our recommendations - would for the first
time be subject to a statutory limitation period. Examples 260
include equitable
wrongs that are not covered by our provisional recommendations on breach of
trust and related actions (for example, breach of confidence); actions for
pronouncing for or against a will in solemn form, actions contesting the title under
which a grant of probate or letters of administration is made, and actions for the
revocation of a grant of representation; 261
actions arising out of the exercise of the
royal prerogative; 262
claims by Her Majesty the Queen or the Duke of Cornwall to
gold and silver mines under the royal prerogative right to such mines; 263
proceedings by the Crown for the recovery of any tax or duty or interest on any tax
or duty; 264
and forfeiture proceedings under the Customs and Excise Acts. 265
The
259 See paras 3.116 - 3.118 above.
260 We are not aware of any other causes of action for which there is no statutory limitation
period, and which are not covered by any other of our provisional recommendations.
Consultees are invited to inform us if they are aware of any.
261 See Tristram & Coote’s Probate Practice (28th ed 1995), pp 606 - 613, Re Coglan; Briscoe v
Broughton [1948] 2 All ER 68, Re Flynn, Flynn v Flynn [1982] 1 WLR 310.
262 Such as an action seeking compensation for the destruction of property pursuant to the
prerogative (Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 HL).
263 See s 37(6) of the 1980 Act. At first sight, one might think that there would be a close
analogy between the exercise of this prerogative right and land-related claims, so that
applying our provisional proposals, a single 10 year limitation period would be appropriate.
But we tend to the view that the prerogative right is likely to be exercised in respect of the
product of the mining rather than by claiming the land: see Attorney-General v Morgan
[1891] 1 Ch 432.
264 Limitation Act 1980, s 37(2)(a). See Hunt v Commissioners of Customs & Excise [1992]
VATTR 255; Lord Advocate v Butt [1992] STC 122. Contrast the time limits for the
assessment of tax (see Table 2 above at pp 127 - 128).
265 Limitation Act 1980, s 37(2)(b).
384