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Limitation of Actions Consultation - Law Commission

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(2) the identity <strong>of</strong> the defendant; and<br />

(3) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that <strong>of</strong> a person other than the<br />

defendant, the identity <strong>of</strong> that person and the additional facts supporting<br />

the bringing <strong>of</strong> an action against the defendant. 203<br />

3.95 Knowledge <strong>of</strong> the law is irrelevant. 204<br />

Constructive, as well as actual, knowledge <strong>of</strong><br />

a fact counts. 205<br />

Although set out in a slightly different way the definition <strong>of</strong> the<br />

starting date (including the four key types <strong>of</strong> fact) is very similar to the date <strong>of</strong><br />

knowledge for the purposes <strong>of</strong> personal injuries actions, as provided in section 14<br />

<strong>of</strong> the 1980 Act, and reference can be made to the personal injury section above<br />

for a full discussion <strong>of</strong> the ingredients <strong>of</strong> the definition. 206<br />

3.96 Under section 14A(7) the damage must be sufficiently serious to justify legal<br />

action. There have been conflicting decisions on the meaning, in this context, <strong>of</strong><br />

“the damage”. In Horbury v Craig Hall & Rutley 207<br />

the plaintiff brought a property<br />

in 1980 in reliance on a surveyor’s report. The report negligently failed to reveal a<br />

number <strong>of</strong> defects in the property. The plaintiff became aware <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> the<br />

defects including an unsafe chimney (which could have been corrected for £132)<br />

in 1982. In 1985 she became aware <strong>of</strong> further defects (requiring extensive<br />

rebuilding <strong>of</strong> the house). In 1988 she sued the surveyors. It was held that the<br />

plaintiff had a single cause <strong>of</strong> action in respect <strong>of</strong> the report and that “the<br />

damage”, as referred to in section 14A, meant all the damage suffered by the<br />

plaintiff in consequence <strong>of</strong> her reliance on that report. The discovery <strong>of</strong> the unsafe<br />

chimney was sufficiently serious to cause a reasonable person to issue proceedings<br />

(given the hypothetical defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to<br />

satisfy a judgment), and that time started to run against the plaintiff from that<br />

point. In consequence the plaintiff’s cause <strong>of</strong> action was time-barred.<br />

3.97 In contrast, in Felton v Gaskill Osbourne & Co 208<br />

it was held that “damage” in<br />

section 14A(7) meant the particular head <strong>of</strong> damages in respect <strong>of</strong> which the<br />

plaintiff was seeking to claim damages, not damages in general. These<br />

proceedings also concerned a negligent surveyor’s report, which failed to refer to<br />

four defects in the property. The fact that the plaintiff had been aware <strong>of</strong> two <strong>of</strong><br />

the minor defects not referred to and had decided that they were tolerable where<br />

another person might have instituted proceedings against the surveyors for<br />

negligence in respect <strong>of</strong> those failures did not mean that the plaintiff was<br />

precluded from suing the surveyors in respect <strong>of</strong> the more serious defects when<br />

they came to his attention. Time did not start to run in respect <strong>of</strong> all the damage<br />

suffered by the plaintiff when he was aware <strong>of</strong> the first damage he suffered.<br />

203 See sections 14A(8) and 14A(6)(b).<br />

204 Section 14A(9).<br />

205 Section 14A(10).<br />

206 See paras 3.38 - 3.65 above. Note, however, that the judicial interpretation <strong>of</strong> s 14 may be<br />

influenced by the discretion to disapply the basic time-limits, whereas there is no such<br />

discretion in relation to s 14A.<br />

207 [1991] CIIL 692 (Judge Bowsher QC, sitting as <strong>of</strong>ficial referee).<br />

208 [1993] 2 EGLR 176.<br />

61

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