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Limitation of Actions Consultation - Law Commission

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have wrongly distributed the estate. 68<br />

It will also apply to claims by beneficiaries<br />

against someone who has been wrongly paid or overpaid by the personal<br />

representatives. 69<br />

Even then, if the personal representative was fraudulent, section<br />

21 applies and there will be no limitation period. But if executors are also<br />

appointed as trustees by the will and they have validly assented the estate to<br />

themselves as trustees then section 21(3) will apply. 70<br />

Because <strong>of</strong> the lack <strong>of</strong><br />

formality required to effect a valid assent <strong>of</strong> personalty, it is sometimes far from<br />

clear when the line between executorship and trusteeship is crossed. 71<br />

4.36 The limitation period under section 22(a) begins on the date when the right to<br />

receive the share or interest accrues and not, in accordance with the language<br />

found elsewhere in the 1980 Act, when the beneficiary’s cause <strong>of</strong> action accrues.<br />

This will apply to actions against personal representatives, and to actions brought<br />

against persons wrongly paid or overpaid out <strong>of</strong> the estate. 72<br />

It appears that the<br />

“right to receive” accrues on the date <strong>of</strong> death <strong>of</strong> the deceased, even though the<br />

beneficiary will not be able to enforce that right until, at the earliest, one year has<br />

expired after the death. 73<br />

Although it is widely accepted to be the law, 74<br />

the judicial<br />

authority for this rule, which leads to the anomalous result that time will run<br />

against a plaintiff before he or she has a right to commence an action 75<br />

is actually<br />

not very strong. 76<br />

68 Although if the personal representatives have acted honestly and reasonably, their liability<br />

may be mitigated by s 21(2): see para 4.24 - 4.26 above.<br />

69 Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465, 512 affirmed sub nom Ministry <strong>of</strong> Health v Simpson [1951] AC<br />

251, 277. This case rejected the approach taken by the court in Re Johnson (1885) 29 Ch D<br />

964, applying the Real Property <strong>Limitation</strong> Act 1833, s 8.<br />

70 See, eg, Re Richardson [1920] 1 Ch 423; Re Oliver [1927] 2 Ch 323. See also Williams,<br />

Mortimer and Sunnucks on Executors, Administrators and Probate (17th ed 1993), p 907.<br />

Because the limitation period under s 21(3) is shorter than the one under s 22(a) it has<br />

been suggested that where executors are also appointed as trustees under a will it is prudent<br />

for them to assent property to themselves as trustees at the earliest possible date, as long as<br />

this does not involve fraud: see, eg, A McGee, <strong>Limitation</strong> Periods (2nd ed 1994), p 253.<br />

71 See, eg, in a context other than limitation, George Attenborough & Son v Solomon [1913] AC<br />

76.<br />

72 Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465, 512 - 514; affirmed sub nom Ministry <strong>of</strong> Health v Simpson [1951]<br />

AC 251, 277.<br />

73 Administration <strong>of</strong> Estates Act 1925, s 44. This period is commonly referred to as “the<br />

executor’s year”.<br />

74 A McGee, <strong>Limitation</strong> Periods (2nd ed 1994), pp 254 - 255; T Prime and G Scanlan, The<br />

Modern <strong>Law</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Limitation</strong> (1993), p 234.<br />

75 Ibid. There is a parallel (noted by McGee) between the position <strong>of</strong> a beneficiary against<br />

whom time is running under s 22, and that <strong>of</strong> potential plaintiffs who are unable to<br />

commence proceedings because <strong>of</strong> a procedural bar, but against whom time runs: see paras<br />

9.26 - 9.27 below.<br />

76 See, eg, Re Deeney [1933] NI 80. The Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal in Northern Ireland, in that case,<br />

was following the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal’s decision in Hornsey Local Board v Monarch Investment<br />

Building Society (1889) 24 QBD 1, which is itself sometimes cited as direct authority (see,<br />

eg, A McGee, <strong>Limitation</strong> Periods (2nd ed 1994), p 255). Hornsey Local Board v Monarch<br />

Investment Building Society concerned the limitation period in respect <strong>of</strong> a statutory public<br />

health body’s right to apportion the cost <strong>of</strong> street works among adjoining property owners,<br />

including the defendant. It was held there that the words “present right to receive” (in<br />

84

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