Limitation of Actions Consultation - Law Commission

(7) Factors Postponing the Running of Time
10.50 Irish law provides for the running of time to be postponed where the plaintiff is
subject to a legal disability at the time when an action accrues. In cases other than
those involving personal injuries, there will be generally be an extension of the
limitation period to the date six years (or three years for a claim for slander) from
the end of the disability. 127
In the case of a claim based on personal injuries, there is
a three-year extension from the end of the disability, if a disability exists either
when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues or on the date of the plaintiff’s
knowledge. 128
There is no provision suspending the running of time in the event of
supervening disability. There is a long-stop date, in land-related actions, of 30
years from the date on which the right of action first accrued. 129
10.51 In relation to personal injury claims, the Statute had contained a proviso that the
section extending the limitation period would not apply unless the plaintiff could
prove that the person under the disability was not in the custody of a parent when
the right of action accrued, 130
but in O’Brien v Keogh 131
the Supreme Court held
that the proviso infringed the citizen’s personal right to litigate, and was therefore
contrary to Article 40 of the Constitution. 132
The provision was repealed by the
Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991. 133
There is no statutory long-stop
date, which means that the possibility exists of actions being brought many years
after the events alleged to have given rise to the claim. However the courts have
developed a willingness to use their inherent equitable jurisdiction to strike out
cases for inordinate delay in prosecution in a manner which has been regarded as
amounting to a de facto long stop. 134
This tendency was begun by the Supreme
Court in O’Domhnaill v Merrick, 135
in which there had been considerable delay in
progressing the proceedings after they had been commenced. But in Toal v
Duignan 136
there was little delay after the commencement of proceedings, yet the
plaintiff’s claim against several of the defendants was still struck out, on the basis
of the length of time which had elapsed since the alleged omissions which formed
the basis of the complaint. 137
127 Ibid, ss 48 and 49.
128 Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991, s 5(1). In relation to the date of the
plaintiff’s knowledge see para 10.40 above.
129 Ibid, s 49(1)(d). A similar provision appears in the English Limitation Act 1980, s 28(4).
See para 8.3 above.
130 Formerly s 49(2)(a)(ii).
131 [1972] IR 144.
132 See para 10.33 above in relation to Article 40 of the Constitution.
133 Section 5(4). The repeal was recommended by the Irish Law Reform Commission: see
Report on the Statute of Limitations: Claims in Respect of Latent Personal Injuries, LRC 21
(1987), pp 51 - 52.
134 B M E McMahon and W Binchy, Irish Law of Torts (2nd ed 1990), p 831.
135 [1984] IR 151.
136 [1991] ILRM 135 (Sup Ct).
137 See also Toal v Duignan (No 2) [1991] ILRM 140, in which the Supreme Court struck out
the same plaintiff’s claim against some, but not all, of the other defendants.
196