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Limitation of Actions Consultation - Law Commission

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the court from allowing the action to proceed with the new plaintiff, although the<br />

limitation period had expired. 90<br />

9.33 Section 35 has the potential effect <strong>of</strong> allowing a counterclaim to be used as a<br />

means to pursue claims which would otherwise have been statute-barred. But this<br />

is subject to the court’s discretion to decide that a claim should be disposed <strong>of</strong> as a<br />

separate action rather than as a counterclaim. 91<br />

That discretion will generally be<br />

exercised on the basis <strong>of</strong> the procedurally most convenient way <strong>of</strong> trying the case. 92<br />

In Ernst & Young v Butte Mining plc (No 2) 93<br />

Lightman J said that he could<br />

conceive <strong>of</strong> circumstances in which the court might exercise its discretion to allow<br />

a counterclaim to proceed in order to avoid the subject matter becoming statute<br />

barred. 94<br />

But where a counterclaim was not justified by procedural convenience<br />

the circumstances would have to be special. 95<br />

9 COMMENCEMENT AND RETROSPECTIVITY<br />

9.34 We intend to make absolutely clear when our proposed Act will commence. But in<br />

deciding what is appropriate as the commencement date, it is important to realise<br />

that the commencement date, and in particular, provisions giving retrospective<br />

effect to limitation enactments have given rise to some difficulties in the past. The<br />

general rule <strong>of</strong> interpretation is that, unless a contrary intention appears, a statute<br />

is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. 96<br />

This is<br />

particularly the case where giving an enactment a retrospective interpretation<br />

would mean that it “takes away or impairs a vested right acquired under existing<br />

laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new<br />

(1) Where a party to an action dies or becomes bankrupt but the cause <strong>of</strong> action<br />

survives, the action shall not abate by reason <strong>of</strong> the death or bankruptcy; (2)<br />

Where at any stage <strong>of</strong> the proceedings in any cause or matter the interest or<br />

liability <strong>of</strong> any party is assigned or transmitted to or devolves upon some other<br />

person, the court may, if it thinks it necessary in order to ensure that all<br />

matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely<br />

determined and adjudicated upon, order that other person to be made a party<br />

to the cause or matter and the proceedings to be carried on as if he had been<br />

substituted for the first mentioned party.<br />

90 See also Industrie Chimiche Italia Centrale v Alexander Tsaviliris & Sons Maritime Co, The<br />

Choko Star [1996] 1 WLR 774, where the original plaintiff, an Italian company, had merged<br />

with another company by way <strong>of</strong> universal succession, having the effect in Italian law <strong>of</strong><br />

vesting all the assets and liabilities <strong>of</strong> the plaintiff in the new company. In that case counsel<br />

for the plaintiff did not pursue the argument that there was no new claim. Mance J held that<br />

RSC O 15, r 7 applied and that the requirements <strong>of</strong> s 35 were therefore satisfied. Cf Toprak<br />

Enerji Sanayi A/S v Sale Tilney Technology PLC [1994] 1 WLR 840 (Judge Diamond QC).<br />

91 RSC, O 15, r 5(2).<br />

92 See, eg, Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co v Brooks (1877) 2 Ex D 243.<br />

93 [1997] 2 All ER 471.<br />

94 Ibid, 482.<br />

95 Lightman J gave as a possible example the situation where the defendant made a<br />

counterclaim during the limitation period which would be applicable if the defendant had<br />

commenced its action by writ, but the court subsequently decided under O 15, r 5(2) that<br />

the action should be brought separately, by which time the limitation period for<br />

commencing the action by writ had expired: ibid, 482.<br />

96 Francis Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (2nd ed 1992), section 97.<br />

175

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