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Limitation of Actions Consultation - Law Commission

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performance, injunctions, or other equitable relief: but this is then subject to the<br />

proviso ‘except in so far as such time limit may be applied by the court by analogy<br />

in like manner as the corresponding time limit under any enactment repealed by<br />

the <strong>Limitation</strong> Act 1939 was applied before 1st July 1940’. By section 36(2),<br />

nothing in the Act is to affect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the<br />

ground <strong>of</strong> acquiescence or otherwise.<br />

13.160 The first part <strong>of</strong> section 36(1) means that, for example, the standard six-year<br />

limitation periods for tort and contract in sections 2 and 5 <strong>of</strong> the 1980 Act do not<br />

apply to equitable remedies, for example, specific performance or injunctions. The<br />

exception in section 36(1) is where the limitation period can be applied by analogy<br />

but, although the authorities are in conflict on this, 227<br />

the better view is that, for<br />

example, specific performance for breach <strong>of</strong> contract would not fall within the ‘by<br />

analogy’ exception. In his masterly and comprehensive examination <strong>of</strong> this<br />

question in “<strong>Limitation</strong> Periods and Specific Performance,” Jack Beatson<br />

concludes, 228<br />

“[T]he statutory limitation period does not apply either directly or<br />

‘by analogy’ to claims for specific performance, but, if it did apply ‘by analogy’, it<br />

would not be applied dispositively: a court considering ordering specific<br />

performance would have regard to the statutory period as one <strong>of</strong> the factors in the<br />

exercise <strong>of</strong> its discretion in considering whether the claim was barred by laches or<br />

acquiescence.” Indeed it seems unclear whether the statutory limitation period for<br />

tort and contract will ever be applied by analogy to equitable remedies, including<br />

an account <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its 229<br />

or equitable damages (that is, damages in lieu <strong>of</strong> an<br />

injunction) for a tort.<br />

13.161 If there is no direct or by ‘analogy’ statutory limitation period applicable to specific<br />

performance or an injunction or an account <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its for a breach <strong>of</strong> contract or<br />

tort, laches can be applied without contradicting Wilberforce J’s view in Re<br />

227 Statements favouring application <strong>of</strong> the statute to specific performance are made in, eg,<br />

Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1, 13; Firth v Slingsby (1888) 58 LT 481, 483. The<br />

contrary view is most clearly stated by Dixon CJ and Fullagar J in Fitzgerald v Masters<br />

(1956) 95 CLR 420, 428; and is also supported by the reasoning (ignoring the statutory<br />

limitation period) in, eg, MEPC v Christian-Edwards [1977] 1 WLR 1328, 1333 (reversed<br />

on another point, [1978] Ch 281, [1981] AC 205); see also the early case <strong>of</strong> Talmash v<br />

Mugleston (1826) 4 LJOS 200, 201. Commentators who consider that the statute can be<br />

applied by analogy to specific performance include Prime & Scanlan, The Modern <strong>Law</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>Limitation</strong> (1993) p 225; McGee, <strong>Limitation</strong> Periods (2nd ed 1994) p 17; Spry, Equitable<br />

Remedies (4th ed 1990), pp 241 - 242, 410. The contrary view is taken by, eg, Jones &<br />

Goodhart, Specific Performance (2nd ed 1996) p 109; Hanbury & Martin (15th ed 1997) p<br />

718; Snell’s Principles <strong>of</strong> Equity (29th ed 1990) pp 34, 36. See, generally, J Beatson,<br />

“<strong>Limitation</strong> Periods and Specific Performance” in Lomnicka and Morse (eds),<br />

Contemporary Issues in Commercial <strong>Law</strong> (1997), pp 9 - 23.<br />

228 Lomnicka and Morse (eds), Contemporary Issues in Commercial <strong>Law</strong> (1997), p 20.<br />

229 A further problem in relation to an account <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its is s 23 which lays down that “An<br />

action for an account shall not be brought after the expiration <strong>of</strong> any time limit ...<br />

applicable to the claim which is the basis <strong>of</strong> the duty to account”. The relationship between<br />

this and s 36 was regarded as confusing by Megarry V-C in Tito v Waddell (No 2) (1977) 1<br />

Ch 106, 250 - 252. It would seem that where s 36(1) applies, s 23 does not. But s 23<br />

would apply, eg, to equitable accounting for a breach <strong>of</strong> trust because s 36(1) is inapplicable<br />

to actions for breach <strong>of</strong> trust.<br />

376

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