Limitation of Actions Consultation - Law Commission

these claims, the limitation period against D1 would expire in 2006, against D2 in
2007, against D3 in 2008, and against D4 in 2009. 85
13.56 We appreciate that the introduction of a limitation period for an action in
conversion against a thief or a receiver of stolen property might be perceived as
making life easier for thieves and their accomplices. However, it should be borne
in mind that the abolition of limitation periods in such actions was a comparatively
recent development, and we believe that the discoverability problem, in response
to which the Law Reform Committee recommended the “theft” exception, 86
is
solved by the application of our proposed discoverability test. Further, the
difference in the treatment of theft of goods and other forms of fraud under the
current Limitation Act seems an illogical one.
13.57 We ask consultees whether they favour the retention of the theft exception,
whereby conversions constituting, or related to, theft (other than a claim
against a bona fide purchaser) are not subject to a limitation period; or
whether, on the contrary, they agree with our provisional view that the
initial limitation period under the core regime (that is, three years from
the date of discoverability) should apply to conversions constituting, or
related to, theft. If consultees support the retention of the theft exception
we ask them to explain why.
(ii) The long-stop limitation period
13.58 Assuming that the date of discoverability is to apply to conversions constituting, or
related to, theft, should there be a long-stop for such actions? To apply the longstop
limitation period to all actions founded on conversion might, in some cases,
be seen to cause injustice to the owner of stolen property. If the initial limitation
period has not expired at the end of ten years - that is, if the owner of the stolen
property does not, having acted reasonably, have the information to bring
proceedings - it would appear to be unreasonable to deprive the owner of any later
chance to recover property from the thief or a receiver of the stolen property.
Unlike actions to recover land, where there will be very few occasions where the
plaintiff lacks the information to bring an action against a squatter at the end of
the limitation period (or indeed any good reason why the plaintiff’s right of action
should be preserved after a decade or more of inactivity), the plaintiff may, at the
end of the long-stop limitation period, still have failed to locate his or her property
or to identify the defendant. 87
85 Under the current law, there would be no limitation period for the actions against D1 and
D2. D3’s and D4’s limitation period would both expire in 2008, 6 years after the first bona
fide sale in 2002.
86 See para 13.52 above.
87 As demonstrated by Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v Goldberg and Fine
Arts, Inc 717 F Supp 1374 (SD Ind 1989) upheld on appeal (917 F 2d 278 (7th Cir 1990),
where the plaintiffs, despite strenuous efforts, only located their property after around 20
years; Solomon R Guggenheim Foundation v Lubell 569 NE 2d 426, in which a Chagall
Gouache was stolen from the Guggenheim Museum in the late 1960s, but only located by
the Solomon Guggenheim Foundation in 1986, and O’Keefe v Snyder (NJ) 416 A 2d 862, in
which three pictures painted by O’Keefe were stolen from an art gallery in 1946, and
located by the artist in September 1975.
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