Limitation of Actions Consultation - Law Commission

3.98 The Court of Appeal has resolved this conflict in favour of the construction in
Horbury v Craig Hall & Rutley. In Hamlin v Edwin Evans 209
the plaintiffs purchased
a house, relying on a structural survey report provided by the defendant. The
survey had failed to reveal dry rot and structural defects. The dry rot was
diagnosed relatively early, and a claim made against the defendant and settled. The
structural defects, which were much more serious, were not discovered until later,
and by the time the plaintiffs commenced proceedings, about two years after
discovering the structural defects, six years had elapsed since the discovery of the
dry rot. The Court of Appeal held that there was only one cause of action, which
rested on the negligent making of the report. The date of knowledge was the date
on which the plaintiffs first had actual or constructive knowledge of damage
resulting from that negligence, which meant, here, the date on which they had
discovered the dry rot. Their claim was therefore barred.
(d) The long-stop provision
3.99 Under section 14B of the 1980 Act, no action may be brought in respect of latent
damage more than 15 years from the date of an act or omission alleged both to
constitute negligence and to be the cause of damage in respect of which the
plaintiff claims damages (where there is more than one date, time runs for the
purpose of this section from the last date). The fact that the plaintiff still does not
know of his cause of action at the expiry of this period is irrelevant. Once the ‘long
stop’ period has expired, the plaintiff’s cause of action is barred.
(e) Successive owners and latent damage
3.100 Where a purchaser of an interest in a property 210
has a claim for negligence in
respect of the property, the limitation periods will be those set out in sections 14A
and 14B of the 1980 Act, but the position is modified by section 3 of the LDA
1986, which was introduced to deal with the problem revealed by Perry v Tendring
District Council. 211
In that case Judge Newey QC, following Pirelli General Cable
Works Limited v Oscar Faber & Partners, 212
held that where the plaintiff purchased
the property after the damage occurred, it would, quite apart from any question of
limitation, not have any action in negligence against the defendant because the
plaintiff did not have any interest in the property at the time when the cause of
action accrued. 213
Section 3 of the LDA 1986 deals with the problem by providing
that where a cause of action has already accrued, and another person acquires an
interest in the property after the original cause of action has accrued, but before
the material facts 214
about the damage are known to anyone who, at the time he
209 [1996] 2 EGLR 106.
210 Including both real and personal property, although the examples in this section will deal
with real property.
211 [1985] 1 EGLR 260.
212 [1983] 2 AC 1. See para 3.15 above.
213 That is, the date of damage.
214 Defined by LDA 1986, s 3(5) as:
such facts about the damage as would lead a reasonable person who has an
interest in the damaged property at the time when those facts become known to
him to consider it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for
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