Journal of European Integration History - Centre d'études et de ...

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 187
neither subversive nor neutral, since it would have been impossible for Italy to play
a more important role in Europe and in the Mediterranean-Middle East scenario
without the US consent. On the other hand, the European integration needed a tighter
relationship with the US so as to avoid Europe turning into a third alternative power.
The European political landscape was the only one in which Italy could play a more
intensive role and most of the efforts were focused on it. For such a reason, the third
parliamentary term cabinets tried to promote a stronger European integration, by
trying to harmonize the competences of ECSC, EEC and Euratom, by supporting the
adhesion of the UK, and by encouraging both the economical negotiations and the
establishment of a new Political Community. Fanfani was certain of the possibility
to combine both the adhesion of the UK to the European Community and the achievement
of more politically coordinated European institutions. In this way, a twofold
aim was meant to be achieved: a truly European integration and the reunification of
Western Europe (the merge of EEC and EFTA). Finally, Fanfani’s idea did not succeed
and, moreover, a renewed French-German alliance marginalized Italy and undermined
the European integration process.
Fanfani did not underestimate the key role played by the EEC but he contextualized
it by considering it just the first step towards closer multilateral co-operations.
His political program was centered on a wide range of relations, from the Western
countries to the Socialist countries and the developing world. Martelli proposes an
original interpretation of Fanfani’s foreign politics, different from the traditional
stream focused on the attempt Fanfani made to change Italian foreign policy. Indeed,
the setting up of a stronger relationship with the Mediterranean countries was not a
new aspect, even though Fanfani tried to make it thrive. The new aspect was the
attempt to place Italy at the same level of the other European powers, in particular
France. Such an idea of an equal relationship with France was abandoned by the next
cabinets but Fanfani reestablished it when he got appointed Prime minister again.
Indeed, Fanfani perceived Charles De Gaulle’s choices as anti-European, and he tried
to hinder them.
Fanfani failed to achieve a level relationship with the other European countries.
Martelli holds that the reason for such a failure is due to the impossibility for Fanfani
to assert himself as the only representative of the Italian foreign policy. However, the
European integration led to an improvement of the Italian international weight, as
Italy was seen as an essential and reliable interlocutor.
Even though Martelli copes with a well already studied field of Italian historiography,
her book reconstructs precisely the Italian foreign policy under Amintore Fanfani
's leadership and without reducing the Italian foreign policy to a mere set of
domestic reactions towards international choices.
Miriam Rossi
Department of History, University of Perugia