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42 Hungdah SU Third, a holy alliance designed by Monnet would also prevent a unifying Europe from allying with powers other than the US when it served European interests and the general interests of the world community. Then the holy alliance would be transformed into a ‘hyper-power’ dominating world politics. Such a ‘hyper-power’ might guarantee the security of the West as a whole, which would create insecurity in those non-Western powers and provoke a nationalistic response. In the end, Monnet’s design to contain European nationalism might ironically provoke nationalistic responses outside of Europe, leading to a clash of civilizations. Last but not least, like many pro-America leaders in Europe, Monnet seems to have overestimated his personal influence and the impact of a unifying or unified Europe on Washington’s foreign policy. In order to obtain American support, he was following American policy in Europe between 1950 and 1970s. He drafted the EDC project, echoed Kennedy’s project creating a ‘Trans-Atlantic Community’, and worked hard to support the MLF in spite of increasing hostility even inside his own Action Committee. He seems to have intended to support these American policies, in which European leaders quite often failed to reach consensus, in exchange for Washington’s support of his grand design. He might also manipulate these American policies as temporary and transitional developments in the future hoped for trans- Atlantic alliance. Unfortunately, loyalty and friendship alone would not constitute effective influence on the superpower. John F. Kennedy’s project creating the Trans- Atlantic Community disappeared immediately in the aftermath of his assassination. The MLF plan was dropped by the Johnson government without any consultation with Monnet or European governments. Unilateralism seems to be the rule in adoption of foreign policy by superpowers while consultation is an exception. As regards equal partnership, the concept does not exist in a superpower’s dictionary. Though Monnet and some American elite advocated the creation of the Trans-Atlantic partnership in early 1960s, they failed to adopt a consensual approach to its implementation. Even between Monnet and George Ball, one of his closest and most influential friends in American politics, the divergences were evident. 58 “Who wants to share power?” said a former member of president George H.W. Bush’s Security Council, “nobody”. 59 Anti-intergovernmentalism Monnet’s anti-intergovernmentalism was illustrated by his well-known motto: “We are not forming coalitions between States, but union among people”. 60 Insisting upon the integration of sovereign nations, Monnet criticized much intergovernmental co- 58. Ibid., p.765. 59. This was quoted from a former member of the Security Council of George Bush at the workshop of LSE on 13 February 1998. 60. J. MONNET, op.cit., p.1.
Jean Monnet’s Grand Design for Europe and its Criticism 43 operation which, according to him, was not useless, but was insufficient to guarantee the security of nations and contain a revival of nationalism. First, intergovernmental cooperation was based upon national sovereignty. Accordingly, such cooperation stopped “when national interests of member states were in conflict, which was then leading to wars”. 61 In order to justify his criticism, Monnet employed David Mitrany’s functionalism developed in the 1930s without denominating it. According to functionalism, the Nation-State’s dominance in human progress was over as more and more problems could not be solved without international cooperation. Then, contrary to Mitrany, Monnet did not believe that any intergovernmental cooperation could solve those trans-national problems in an efficient and effective way for this cooperation was by nature a national solution. The only escape was multinational integration with sovereign transfer. “The nation-state once played an irreplaceable role but its role was put into question in the modern world”. 62 Second, intergovernmental cooperation could not but make decisions with unanimity. Without any integrated institutions, this consensual rule would result in either a frequent immobility in striving for cooperation, or a ceaseless power struggle among participant states. 63 Nonetheless, Monnet did not oppose intergovernmental cooperation outside of European integration or between a unifying or unified Europe and third countries. He even accepted intergovernmental cooperation among European countries in political affairs provided that this cooperation would lead to future integration, which explains why Monnet had once supported de Gaulle’s Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s. But Monnet began condemning intergovernmental cooperation as early as he judged that this cooperation would be established at the price of the European integration. “Why did France”, he asked in his Memoirs, “try to bring back into an intergovernmental framework what had already become a Community”? 64 If Monnet tolerated the Fouchet Plan, he never hesitated to prevent the Elysée Treaty from entering into effect for this bilateral treaty was signed outside of the Community and was interpreted by Monnet to invalidate and even replace the European Community. Before Adenauer’s visit to Paris, Monnet wrote to the German chancellor to put the Franco-German cooperation inside the existent Community and to support the British membership in spite of de Gaulle’s hostility. On the eve of the signature of the Elysée Treaty, Monnet again went to the German embassy to meet Adenauer to reiterate his insistence in vain. 65 After the signature, Monnet began working with a CDU fraction in the Bundestag to adopt a preamble in its ratification of the Elysée Treaty in order to ‘mitigate’ or even invalidate the newborn Franco-German cooperation. 66 61. FJM, AMG 49/2/42. 62. FJM, AML 338/21. 63. FJM, AML 285. 64. J. MONNET, op.cit., p.439. 65. Archiv der Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Jean Monnet to Konrad Adenauer, 16.01.1963. 66. Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, Max Kohnstamm to Kurt Birrenbach, 15.02.1963.
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