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146 Flight to Freedom
the planning of many expeditions was that the officers often made no secret
of the fact that they were on special assignments against the Maroons, and
the build-up of a large body of troops at a particular point usually signalled
that a large-scale expedition was imminent. Moreover, soldiers trained in
Western combat tactics rather than guerrilla or face-to-face warfare proved
largely incapable of fighting in forests, in swamps, among rocks, in caves and
in other unfamiliar terrain where they encountered their adversaries – and
were often cut to pieces. Their usefulness was therefore considerably reduced
in Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Jamaica and Suriname. 4
The contemporary literature sometimes refers to large contingents of regular
foreign soldiers (usually accompanied by local regulars and irregulars)
who proved totally incapable of matching a few dozen Maroons in desultory
warfare, though some of them distinguished themselves for bravery. Buckley
(1998, 218) explains that the vast forests and mountain retreats that encompassed
the camps appeared strange, impenetrable and even hostile to soldiers
who were not trained to operate in such an environment. Besides, the woods
were the haunt of the formidable Maroons, whose adroit use of the forest
cover unnerved their unwary foes. Davidson (1979, 99) observes that in
Mexico the military expeditions encountered major strategic and tactical
problems, especially in operations against hideouts in the frontier regions.
The Maroons knew their habitats intimately, usually used a combination
of natural and man-made defences, and often chose the time and place when
direct confrontations would take place. The troops might surprise small
groups of Maroons, as happened on some occasions, but were rarely able to
capture significant numbers at one time. This caused great chagrin to the
White officers, who often concluded that such expeditions were exercises in
futility.
In the smaller or less developed plantation societies, the army was usually
very small and sometimes virtually non-existent. This is true of most of the
small islands of the southern Caribbean, with the notable exceptions of
St Lucia and Barbados, which were the headquarters of imperial forces
stationed in the region. In Suriname, as in other Dutch colonies in the late
eighteenth century, the army appeared more like an irregular than a regular
force. Stedman (1988, 82) wrote, concerning the members:
The military in Surinam are composed of several very good and experienced
officers and well innured [sic] to the service, but for theyr [their] private men I