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Negotiations and Treaties
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ment seriously abridged the freedom of the Windward Maroons and also
that of all other Maroon groups. The Leewards were now on the side of the
British, returning runaways and attempting to subvert Maroon groups that
refused to submit to the authoritarian state (Patterson 1979, 274). Cudjoe contributed
a force of some fifty warriors to the military expedition against the
Windwards. Still, these much more fearsome warriors were not conquered.
In fact, in the main expedition sent to subdue them in 1739, they had by far
the better of the encounter, killing a number of the invaders and forcing most
of the soldiers and baggage carriers to flee for their lives. Shortly afterward,
another expedition was dispatched, this time along with a captured Maroon
who had explained to them the intricacies of the defence system. On this
occasion the expeditionary force made it clear that they had come to parley
rather than to fight. Perhaps it became increasingly clear to the Windwards
that Cudjoe’s treaty with the British had seriously compromised their own
integrity, since they would now have to fight two antagonists instead of one.
After a lengthy discussion and apparently some disagreement among the
leaders (see chapter 10), they agreed to sign a treaty with the dreadful clauses
that required them to return all future fugitives who came their way and hunt
down all those who refused to submit to the colonial authorities (Campbell
1990, 120–25). 29
Some proposed treaties were not signed or broke down for a number of
reasons, including misunderstandings, distrust by the Maroons, disagreement
with certain conditions laid down by the authoritarian state, and treachery. In
1662 negotiations with the Bahoruco Maroons – thought to constitute as
many as six hundred families in four main communities (Landers 2002, 4) –
that Archbishop Francisco de la Cueva Maldonado of Santo Domingo was
to mediate fell through, apparently because the Maroons did not trust
the Whites. The main Maroon leader had made this point very clear to the
archbishop, but had nevertheless agreed to meet with him shortly to finalize
the terms of peace. The archbishop’s proposal had included the recognition
of the Maroons’ right to their freedom on condition that they agreed to relocate
to a more accessible area that the government would assign to them, to
become Christians and to track down future runaways. However, the
Maroons had a change of heart and did not keep the rendezvous with the
archbishop (Esteban Deive 1989, 84–85; Arrom and García Arévalo 1986,
83–84).
Treachery also played its part in the relations between Maroons and the