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308 Flight to Freedom
catchers” could be viewed as genuine “revolutionaries or even reformers, seeking
to transform the society from one of servitude to freedom”. She states
further that “this aspect of the Maroon story, which is so universal, must be
one of the most perplexing” (ibid., 131). Thoden van Velzen (1995, 113) opines
that “Particularly galling, and a cause of considerable friction later, were those
articles of the treaty demanding that maroons deliver all later runaways into
the hands of their former masters.” He is convinced that the main effect of
the treaties was to transform former foes into vassals.
As noted already, the vast majority of treaties with Maroons, following the
Spanish precedent in the sixteenth century, incorporated some clause about
the return of new runaways, and by the late seventeenth century this had
become a sine qua non of such treaties from the viewpoint of the slaveholders.
Similar provisions are found in the treaties made with the Maroons of Cofre
de Perote in Mexico; Diego de Ocampo in the Dominican Republic; Juan de
Bolas’s group and the Windwards and Leewards in Jamaica; the Saramakas,
Ndjukas and Matawais in Suriname; the Puerto Bello Maroons (relocated to
Santiago del Principe after the peace treaty) in Panama; and the San Basilio
Maroons in Colombia. Juan López Cepeda, president of the Audiencia,
declared concerning the “pacified” Santiago del Principe Maroons that they
served as a check against other Maroons (La Guardia 1977, 95; see also
96–97). In the case of Juan de Bolas, the Jamaican government recognized
him as “Colonel of the Black Regiment” in that colony’s militia, a semiformal
incorporation of him and his men into the pro-slavery forces
(Campbell 1990, 23; Patterson 1979, 254). One British officer expressed the
view that the new allies “are now become our bloodhounds . . . and they are in
our behalf more violent and fierce against their fellows than we possibly can
be” (Campbell 1990, 21).
It is difficult to justify Maroon agreement to return future runaways, and
we cannot comfort ourselves that this aspect of the treaties generally
remained a dead letter. The fact is that subsequent to the treaties, many
groups actively pursued and returned runaways for bounties, material gains
that replaced those that they had previously obtained through assaults on
White properties. Worse still, some of them played major roles in putting
down servile revolts and destroying new Maroon settlements. As noted
already, the post-treaty Maroons in Jamaica played a signal role in quelling
the large-scale Tackey revolt in 1760 and killing Tackey himself. They
were also the chief antagonists of the new group that was developing under