60199616-flight-to-freedom-african-runaways-and-maroons-in-the-americas

Notes to pages 290–306
347
who, because they were not inclined to make total war on the whites to liberate their
captive brethren, were not felt to be particularly dangerous.”
24. This last clause contained seeds of contention. It was left up to the colonial state ultimately
to determine when mistreatment occurred, and to enforce the right of the
enslaved person to secure his or her freedom at the correct price, assuming that he or
she was in a financial position to do so. It is therefore doubtful that this clause was
enforced with any regularity, though the abuses certainly occurred.
25. Treaties between the Indians and the Americans (British and then US) often contained
clauses about the return of African runaways, though the Indians usually did
not comply with this aspect of the treaties (Porter 1932, 308, 328).
26. Writers disagree on the date of the treaty. Some hold that 1609 was the definitive
date, whereas others view that as the year when the first overtures began but resulted
in a breakdown of talks and the continuation of Maroon activities by Yanga and his
men. Others regard 1630 as the date when the viceroy of Mexico, acting on behalf of
the imperial government, finally ratified the treaty, by which time Yanga was dead.
The ratification in 1630 also conceded the Maroons’ right to own land, something
that the Mexican government had not accorded up to that time to free Blacks (see
Pereira 1994, 99–101; Naveda Chávez-Hita 2001, 126; Palmer 1976, 127–30).
27. See Pérez de Ribas (1896, 1:290–93); Pereira (1994, 99–101); Naveda Chávez-Hita
(2001, 126); Palmer (1976, 126–30).
28. In 1580 the Colombian government spoke about “the pacification of the black
Maroons” of Santiago del Principe (De la Guardia 1977, 94). The Suriname government
often referred to the Ndjukas, Saramakas and Matawais as “pacified Bush
Negroes” or “pacified Maroons” (Campbell 1990, 112–14, 124; Thoden van Velzen 1995,
113, 124). The agreement of some Maroon communities to move from their hideouts
to more accessible places, or their involuntary movement by the state authorities
some years after they had demobilized, adds to the view that they had become pacified.
This, for instance, was the case with the Cofre de Perote, Enriquillo and
Windward Maroons.
29. Bev Carey (1997, 343–50) claims that it was only at the fourth attempt that the British
managed to get the Windward Maroons to sign a treaty with them.
30. Pérez de la Riva (1979, 55) attributes the successful ambush of Sánchez and his chief
men to one of his followers, who betrayed him to the Whites.
Chapter 10
1. See also Campbell (1990, 165).
2. See, for instance, Campbell (1990, 102–4).
3. See Carroll (1977, 498–99); Pereira (1994, 102–3); Corro (1951, 23); Naveda Chávez-
Hita (2001, 167).