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Workplace Rules and Practices 13-7
The regulations were justified according to the Court on two grounds: 1)
as a means of making police officers readily recognizable to the public,
and 2) as a means of fostering esprit de corps through similarity of
appearance.
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) in Massachusetts has upheld
the decision to discipline a police officer for failing to comply with the
departmental grooming code. In Board of Selectmen of Framingham v. Civil
Service Commission, the SJC upheld the indefinite suspension of a police
oficer whose long hair violated the department’s grooming policy. 57 Later,
the Appeals Court also determined that the policy was not so “irrational as
to be branded arbitrary,” and upheld the regulation on the grounds that it
promoted morale and engendered respect from the community. 58
With respect to firefighters, the U.S. Supreme Court has also upheld
grooming regulations. In a per curiam decision dismissing certiorari, the
Supreme Court upheld a fire department hair grooming regulation, stating
that the regulation was supportive of “the overal need for discipline, esprit
de corps, and uniformity.” 59 In prior cases, federal courts had upheld
such regulations only where they could be linked to safety justifications. 60
For example, facial hair - beards or mustaches - prevented gas masks or
SCBA equipment from sealing properly. In Quinn v. Muscare, however, the
Supreme Court stated that any factual determination concerning a safety
justification for the grooming rule was “immaterial.” 61
The LRC has held that dress and grooming standards are mandatory
subjects of bargaining, so that an employer desiring to institute such
regulations must first bargain with the union. 62 A department which has
continuously enforced its grooming regulations is free to continue to do
so. 63 However, a department which finds itself in the position of not
having enforced its existing regulations for a considerable period of time,
or having become lax in enforcing certain portions of the rules, may need
to provide notice to the union before starting to enforce the rules again .64
The Sheriff of Worcester County was found guilty of failing to bargain in
good faith by unilaterally implementing a policy of prohibiting corrections
officers from wearing union pins, including union insignia, without giving
the union prior notice and an opportunity to bargain to resolution or
impasse.65 In addition, the LRC ruled that the Sheriff interfered with,
restrained and coerced his employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed under the Law by prohibiting the wearing of union insignia, in
violation of the Law. On appeal, the court held that prescribing uniforms
for officers was a core management function exempt from collective
bargaining requirements, but, the sherif’s asserted need for discipline and
uniformity was not a “special circumstance” that would warrant banning
union pins. The Appeals Court explained that it did not think the right to
prescribe uniforms contained in G.L. c. 126, § 9A, supersedes the officers'
Massachusetts Municipal Police Training Committee