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Management Rights - AELE's Home Page

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Workplace Rules and Practices 13-9<br />

anti-adornment/uniform policy in a consistent<br />

and nondiscriminatory manner, a special<br />

circumstance exists, as a matter of law, which<br />

justifies the banning of union buttons" (emphasis<br />

added). 72<br />

"Special circumstances" rarely, if ever, are found in the absence of a<br />

comprehensive ban on all nonstandard adornments. See, e.g., Dighton<br />

School Comm., 8 M.L.C. at 1305 ("We are further convinced that no<br />

special circumstances exist to prohibit [union] buttons by the fact that<br />

other buttons were worn ... without ... interference or comment by the<br />

school administration. A rule which is enforced only against union<br />

buttons demonstrates the lack of any truly legitimate purpose for the<br />

rule"). 73 The record in this case, however, discloses nothing remotely<br />

resembling a comprehensive prohibition.<br />

We agree with the sheriff that "the need for discipline, uniformity and an<br />

absolutely impartial appearance exists at the Jail." People with violent<br />

tendencies live at the jail. A paramilitary organization and command<br />

structure are essential for the safety of inmates and correction officers<br />

alike. But the long period before April 22, 1997, during which the sheriff<br />

had no policy prohibiting pins, and the fact that his April 22 edict appears<br />

to have fallen with particular force on union pins, supports the<br />

commission's conclusion that no special circumstances connected to the<br />

jail's mission, command structure, need for discipline or other functional<br />

requirement justified the sheriff's unilateral prohibition of the union<br />

buttons employees presumptively were entitled to wear. 74 Therefore, the<br />

commission's conclusion that the April 22 directive, insofar as it affected<br />

union buttons, violated G.L. c. 150E, §§ 10(a)(1) and 10(a) (5), was<br />

supported by substantial evidence and did not amount to an error of law.<br />

We do not preclude the possibility that circumstances may change over<br />

time in a way that enables the sheriff to meet his burden at some point in<br />

the future. 75<br />

In light of the foregoing, paragraphs 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), and 2(b) of the<br />

commission's order are reversed insofar as they pertain to badges, pins,<br />

and any nonstandard uniform attire other than pins and badges<br />

containing union insignia. The commission shall modify the "Notice to<br />

Employees" referenced in paragraph 2(c) of its order so that it is consistent<br />

with this opinion. In all other respects, the commission's order is affirmed.<br />

So ordered.<br />

The Oxford Police Chief could have banned all non-department-supplied<br />

pins and insignia on oficers’ uniforms. However, by alowing DARE<br />

patches and “guardian angel” pins, for example, and banning any union<br />

pins, the town violated the law by discriminating against the union. 76<br />

Massachusetts Municipal Police Training Committee

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