By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

efore them the written proposals from the applicants which are annexture D to theapplication. But I note that the Annexture D is dated 14/11/1986 and therefore couldnot have been considered by the Assistant price Commissioner on 11/11/1986In fact the document of 14/11/1986 is a letter in which the applicants mounted anattack on the process fixed by the Commissioner. Now the question arises as towhether the applicants were entitled to be heard. I answer that question in theaffirmative.Any statutory body when exercising the powers conferred on it by a stature must actin accordance with the principles of natural justice or fairness, unless they areexpressly excluded by the relevant legislation. I subscribe to the view taken by LordUpjohn of the Privy Council in the case of Durayappah vs. Fernando48 that.47. (1967) 2 All E.R 152 P.COn the question of audi alteram partem. The statute can make itself clear on thispoint and if it does, cadit question. If it does not then the pronciple stated byByles, J. in Cooper vs. Wandsworth of Works49 must applied. He said this: alongcourse of decisions beginning with R. vs. Cambridge university – Bentley’sCase50 and ending with some very recent cases; establish that although there areno positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet thejustice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature.In the case at hand the statute is silent about the doctrine of audi alteram partem andtherefore we shall supply the omission.However it is not always that the principles of natural justice apply. In the abovementioned case Lord Upjohn said that the principles were applicable to victims ofdismissal from office, those deprived of their property and those expelled from clubsand he left it open for the other cases when the principles would apply. Recently inKenya Mulli, J. in the case of Angaha vs. Registrar of Trade Unions, 51 afterdiscussing various decided cases held that the right to be heard was confined to wherethe matter was:“Concerned with vested rights which were sought to be interfered with withoutallowing those affected to be heard in respect of their vestedrights.”But the better view on the matter seems to me is the statement by Lord Denning M.R inthe case of Achmidt vs Secretary of State52 that:“I quite agree of course that where a public officer has power to deprive a personof his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it is not to be donewithout his being given an opportunity of being heard and of makingrepresentation son his own behalf.”132