By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

tot for anything done by Maharaj J. while discharging or purporting to discharge anyresponsibilities of a judicial nature vested in him; nor for anything done by the police orprison officers who arrested and detained the appellant while discharging responsibilitieswhich they had in connection with the execution of judicial process. Section 4 (6) of theState (formerly “Crown”) Liability and Proceedings Act 1966 so provides. At that timetoo there was no right of appeal on the merits against an order of a High Court judgecommitting a person to imprisonment for contempt of court, except to the JudicialCommittee by special leave which it alone had power to grant. Nevertheless, on the faceof it the claim for redress for an alleged contravention of his constitutional right undersection 1 (a) of the Constitution fell within the original jurisdiction of the High Courtunder section 6 (2). This claim does not involve any appeal either on fact or onsubstantive law from the decision of Maharaj J. that the appellant on April 17, 1975, wasguilty of conduct that amounted to a contempt of court. What it does involve is an inquiryinto whether the procedure adopted by that judge before committing the appellant wasentitle under section 1 (a), not to be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law.Distasteful though the task may well appear to a fellow judge of equal rank, theConstitution places the responsibility for undertaking the inquiry fairly and squarely onthe High Court.It was argued for the Attorney-General that even if the High Court had jurisdiction, he isnot a proper respondent to the motion. In their themselves to the question raised it wouldseem convenient to set out the most important of those provisions of the Constitutionupon which in their Lordships’ view the answers turn.49