By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

(1970) E.A. 523. It is true that the learned judge found that G.N. 41/92 had nosafeguards against arbitrary increases of rent, but he did not think this wasnecessarily fata to the validity or constitutionality of the order because in his viewtenants of the second respondent could pursue and enforce their legal rights inthe ordinary Courts. In the Shah Case quoted above, the Court felt obliged tointervene because the legislation in question i.e. The Local Administration(amendment) Act 1961 violated the provisions of Article 8 of the UgandaConstitution in that:(a) It had the effect of depriving a party of property without compensation.(b) It had the effect of depriving an aggrieved party of “protection the law” inthat it shut out litigation and prevented him from ventilating his grievancesin Court.(c) It gave power to the Minister responsible to nullify even court judgementsincluding the High court.We therefore ask ourselves whether G.N. 41/92 has any of these or similareffect. We do not think so. Like the learned judge we think it would have beenfairer if the order had provisions safeguarding the interests of the tenants againstthe possibility of arbitrary increases of rent by their powerful landlord, but we aresatisfied that despite being freed from the controls in the Rent Restriction Act byG.N. 41/92, the second respondent does not have and the order did not intend togrant it arbitrary powers to increase rent. We are satisfied that the secondrespondent country wide can seek redress in the ordinary Courts. In thecircumstances, it is not correct to say that G.N. 41/92 created two categories of528