By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

of law and order. I provision like s. 41 is therefore a necessary concomitant to therealization of these rights. Moreover, there is inherent in the provision a safeguard againstarbitrary use.It comes into play when the holdings or continuance of an assembly or procession “ispermanently likely to cause a breach of the peace, or to prejudice the public safety or themaintenance of public order and to be used for any unlawful purpose, “and thereforemeets what is termed the” clear and present danger test. In Muhammad Nawaz Sharifcited earlier, Saleem Akhtar, J. said, at pp. 832 -833:-Diary restriction (on basic rights) must pass the test of reasonableness and averridingpublic interest. Restriction can be imposed and freedom may be curtailed provided it isjustified by the “clear and present danger” test enunciated in Saia v. New York (1948)334 US 558 that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree ofimminence extremely high.Section 41, in my view, is conditioned on a clear and present danger where thesubstantive evil is extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Asituation befitting the application of the provision can be found in the Guyanese case ofC.R Ramson v. Lloyed Barker and the Attorney General (1983) 9 CLB 1211. That casearose from the dispersal of a political meeting by the police. The plaintiff, in Attorney –at – law, was standing near his motor car parked by the roadside discussing with acolleague the methods used by the police to disperse the crowd.A policeman came up, held the plaintiff by his arm and asked him what he was doingthere, and was told “that is my business.” Other policemen came up and surrounded theplaintiff, who was then jabbed several times in the ribs with a basin by another policemanwho ordered him into the car. The plaintiff and his colleague then got into the carunwillingly and drove away.The plaintiff later brought action alleging, inter alia, an infringement of his rights tofreedom of assembly, expression and movement. It was held by the Court of Appeal thatthere was no infringement of the constitutional right to the freedom of assembly,expression or movement as the action of the police was not directed towards a hindranceor depravation of these constitutional freedoms.These factors apart, it is equally apparent that the petitioner admits the legitimaterule of the police at assemblies and processions although, somehow, he does not realizethat this role is specially authorized by court Para 19 (h) of the petition states in part;The court should also declare that a citizen has right to convene a peaceful assembly ofpublic rally and the right to make a peaceful demonstration or procession without apermit from anybody except that he should just inform the police before doing so(my emphasis).219