By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act. He can exempt any premises orclass of premises. The premises exempted by GN. 41/92 are covered underthe description any, whereas those under G.N. 23/83 are covered under thedescription class of premises. We therefore do not see why Mr. Matata wouldwant to limit the Minister’s power of exemption to a class of premises whenthe first part of the section widens the power to any premises. Since sallpremises must have owners, it is strange to suggest that an order would berendered invalid simply by identifying their owner. For these reasons we aresatisfied that GN. 41/92 is not ultra vires the enabling section of the Act. Thisground of appeal therefore fails.In ground 3 the appellants averred that had the trial judge properly directedhimself on the rules of staturory interpretation, he would have found thatsection 2 (1) (b) of Act 17/84 does not confer upon the 1 strespondentparliamentary power to amend a substantive provision of a statute (section 11of the National Housing Corporation Act No. 2 / 1990). In support of thisground, Mr. Matata contended that the effect of the order by the 1 strespondent was to amend section 11 of the National Housing Corporation Actwhich he was not empowered to do. In reply intend to amend section 11 orany other provision of the National Housing Corporation Act.We agree with Mr. Matata that the 1 st respondent, the Minister for LandsHousing and Urban Development has no power to amend an Act of531