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By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

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epresenting the Crown, the third there he was acting in a purely individualcapacity and the second, which he considered created the difficulty, involving aperson designated in an official capacity but not representing the Crown. As tothe second category Upjohn I said (1955) 2 All ER 453 at 457, (19955) Ch 567 at575 – 576):It is possible that there may be special Acts where named persons have specialduties to perform which would not be duties normally fulfilled by them in theirofficial capacity: but in the ordinary case where the relevant or appropriateminister is directed to carry out the function or policy of some Act, it seems to mehe is either acting in his capacity as a Minister of the Crown representing theCrown, or is acting in his personal capacity , usually the former. I find it verydifficults to conceive of a middle classification.I do not find the scope of this statement clear. If Upjon I was intending to suggestthat it was not possible for a minister to be under a personal liability and subjectto injuctive relief for wrongs committed by him in his official capacity then it isinconsistent with the authorities ited earlier. The approach indicated by thoseauthorities was relied on by the plainfiff in Merricks (1955( 2 All ER 453 at 455,(1955) Ch 567 at 571 who cited in support the list instance decision of RoxburghI in Harper v Secretary of State for <strong>Home</strong> Dept (1954) Times, 18 DecemberHowever, that was a case heard ex parte and Upjon I did not in those579

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