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unable to agree with the applicant that Annoxture “DI”. is excluded by thisprovision.The applicant also submitted that Annoxture “DI” ought to be excluded on thedoctrine of estoppel. He cited the previsions of Section 123 of the Evidence Actto the effect that when one person has, by this declaration, act or omission,intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true andto act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative would be allowed, inany suit or preceding between himself and such person or his representative, tolony the truth of that thing. He pointed out that Annoxture “A” was an intentionaldeclaration by the Government to the effect that he had been retired in the publicinterest and that, believing the declaration to be true, he ated upon it bycommuning these processing. In the circumstances, he argued that theGovernment was estopped from denying the truly of Annoxturo “A” by purportingto substitute Annoxturo “DI” for it. Mr. Mono responded by pointing out theessential elements of stopped hitch he could not see in this case, and bysubmitting that there can be no stopple against the law of the land.Our Evidence Act of 1967 is largely inspired by the Indian Evidence Act of 1872;indeed, S.123 under reference is in part material with S. 115 of the Indian statute.In the case of Nurdia bandali V. Lombanis Tanganyika Ltd. (1963) E.A.304, theCourt of Appeal for Eastern Africa observed (at p. 317) that as the IndianEvidence Act, which then applied to Mainland Tanzania, was designed to cover472