By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

the view that the appellant’s termination was justified in the light of the appellant’sproved or admitted misconducts such as the loaning of money to himself withoutauthority. With due respect to the learned judge. However, this did not do awaywith the need to along the appellant was protesting his innocence against theallegation which were made against him. His admission of some of the affixationswere invariably accompanied explanationsDesigned to absolve him. In those circumstance if the disciplining authority wasminded to impose a sanction on him, as indeed it did it was right and proper, inaccordance with the principle of natural justice, to hear him before condemninghim. Indeed, even if his admissions of the allegations before the probe team wereseemingly unequivocal, we think that it was still necessary to afford him theopportunity to put up his defence before the board of directors although it wouldnecessarily be the same as his defence before the probe team.Mr. Muccadam, learned counsel for the respondents contended before us andalso in the High Court that the appellant was duly afforded the opportunity to beheard when he was called upon to defend himself before the KUBK With duerespect to the leaned counsel, however, this argument cannot be sustained.First, the KUBK was not the authority, which imposed the sanction beingcomplained against. The sanction was imposed by the board of director of theW.D.C. the appellant’s appearance therefore ought properly to have been beforethat body. What is more and this seems to be even more serious the evidenceshows that the substance of the appellant’s defence was not placed before wasnot paced before the board of directors. The Deputy Secretary- General ofJUWATA Mr. Elias Mashashi stated in his evidence for the defence that thereport of the KUBK (Ex.D1) was not submitted to the board of directors of theW.D.C. This means that the board of directors terminated the appellant’semployment purely o the strength of a bare recommendation by the KUBK andthat was totally wrong.We are satisfied that the learned trial judge wrongly dismissed the appellant’sclaims for defamation and for wrongful termination of his employment355