By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

contravenes, is contravening or is likely to contravene his right to receive or impartinformation.The contravention has to be read in the provisions themselves. It transpires that thepetitioner’s complaint is in fact founded on the banning of the “Michapo” and “Cheka”newspapers vide Government Notice No. 8 if 1993. That is improper. The use or misuseof the powers granted y s. 25 the relevant provision in that connection has nothing to dowith the validity of that provision as such.What would be relevant is whether Parliament had no power to grant those powers. Asfor the misfortunes of “Michapo” and “Cheka” the doors were open for the option ofjudicial review but it seems better option were found. Can we alternatively say that thisissue falls under public interest litigation? I don’t think so either.As seen before, public interest litigation is litigation in the interest of the public. In otherwords, the general public, or section thereof, must be seen to be aggrieved by the state ofthe law and to be desirous of redress.There could probably e provisions in the Newspaper Act one could consider oppressive,unreasonable and even unconstitutional, but that is beside the point, the point is that thereis no evidence of public agitation against that law. And by “public” I do not mean merelynewspaper editors but the Tanzania public generally.Laconically, whatever ills this law be identified with appear to be overshadowed by theunprecedented upsurge of private newspapers in recent years. As stated in Sanjeey Cokemanufacturing Co v. Phaant Coking Coal Ltd. AIR 1983 SC 239, court are not authorizedto make disembodied pronouncements on serious an cacudy issues of constitutionalpolicy without battle lines being properly drawn. Judicial pronouncements cannot beimmaculate local conceptions, it is but right that no important point of law of could bedecided without a proper issue between parties properly in ranged on either side and acrossing of the swords.It is inexpedient for the Court to dolve into problems which do not arise and expressopinion thereon. In the premises I decline to pronounce on the third issue.The fourth issue brings us to the provisions of the Police Force Ordinance and thePolitical Act touching on assemblies and processions. Under s. 40 of the former a permitis necessary to organize an assembly or procession in a public place.The permit is grantable by the District Commissioner. Similarly, political parties requirea permit from the District Commissioner to hold public meetings pursuant to theprovisions of s. 11 (1) of the Political Parties Act. Section 41 of the Ordinance empowersa police officer above the rank of inspector or any magistrate to stop or prevent anyassembly or procession if the holding or continuance of it “is imminently likely to cause abreach of the peace, or to prejudice the public safety…” The police officer or magistratemay therefore give orders, including orders for the dispersal of the assembly orprocession. Section 42 defined what constitutes an unlawful assembly or procession,216