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By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

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appropriate respondent, i.e, if in any case the appropriate respondent has notbe joined.G. A defendant is always entitled to know what offence he is charged with and ifhe is not told there is a fundamental failure of due process, see a bare chargeof contempt is not specific enough. As to due process, see Allman v.Thornhill (unreported), December 22, 1976, de Freitas v Benny [1976] A.C.239 and Thompson v. Louisville (1960) 362 U.S. 199. “Redress” in section6 of the Constitution is not a term is not a term of art: forH. Its ordinary meaning, see The shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3 rd ed.(1944). The appellant adopts the reasoning in Jaundoo v. Attorney-General ofGuyana [1971] A.C. 972, 982, 983. The word is used in its widest possiblesense and entitles and requires the court to give relief appropriate to particularcircumstances. Although research has not revealed a case where a personwrongfully sent to prison has obtained damages save for the tort of falseimprisonment, Jaundoo v. Attorney-General of Guyana shows that monetarycompensation is appropriate where there is no other remedy.The Attorney-General is the appropriated part against whom a plaintiff may bringproceedings for redress under section 6 of the Constitution. If a plaintiff has a remedyagainst, the Attorney-General is the proper part representing the state against whomthe court can award damages.Note the provisions of the State (formerly Crown) Liability and Proceedings Act1966. Philips J.A was right in saying that the human rights and fundamentalfreedoms declared by section 1 and specifically protected by section 2 of theConstitution were primarily justifiable against the state. The principle is thatfundamental rights being guaranteed no organ of the state may act in contravention ofthem.The order of Maharaj J. was not the act of an ordinary toreador. It was a state actperformed by the judicial arm of state. The right of an individual to liberty and theright to be deprived thereof save by due process of law existed before thecommencement of the Constitution but its entrenchment as constitutional right gave ita new status not only by reason of the formalities required for its abrogation orabridgment but also as a result of the creation by section 6 of the Constitution of anew right of redress in respect of contravention which is primarily intended to beinvoked in cases of contravention by the state as opposed to that by privateindividuals. Section 6 of the constitution owes its origin to Article 5 (5) of the6

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