By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

quite out of accord with practice, which has always been followed on judicialreview and would involve the expense and delay of two hearings when at presentthere is usually one. The clear intent of Ord 53, r 3(10) is that the court where itconsiders an application for leave at an oral hearing should deal with questionsof interim relief if it is appropriate to do so. During the course of the hearing Mr.Richards was asked whether he could provide any justification for Lord Bridgeregarding the language of s 31 (2) and s 31 (3) together with Ord 53, r 3 (10) asconclusively refuting the view that s 31 (2) was intended to provide a solution tothe problem of the lack of jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions against theCrown but he was not able to do so. Prior to the introduction of Ord 53 there wasthe same problem of the inability to grant interim injunctions against bodies whichhad no connection with the Crown. The changes which are reflected in ss 31(2)and (3) and Ord 53, r 3 (10) provided a solution in relation to those bodies and itmust surely follow that ifs 31(2) gives the court jurisdiction to grant finalinjunctions against ministers it must also provide the jurisdiction . Counsel for theapplicants in Factortame did not reply to the Crown’s submissions on this aspectof the case and I expect this explains why in Factortame the position wasmisunderstood.I am, therefore, of the opinion that, the language of s 31 being unqualified in itsterms, there is no warrant for restricting its application so that in respect ofministers and other officers of the Crown alone the remedy of an injunction,including an interim injunction, is not available. In my view the history of595