By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

in cases of judicial misbehavior, albert limited to deprivation of due process? Themajority decision involves an affirmative answer. Section 6 provided:“6 (1) for the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that if any person alleges that any ofthe provisions of the foregoing sections or section of this Constitution has been, is being,or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any otheraction with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person may applyto the High Court shall have original jurisdiction (a) to hear and determine anyapplication made by any person in pursuance of subsection (1) of this section;.. and maymake such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may considerappropriate for the purpose of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any of theprovisions of the said foregoing section or section to the protection of which the personconcerned is entitled …. (4) any person aggrieved by any determination of the HighCourt under this section may appeal there from to the Court of appeal. (5) nothing in thissection shall limit the power of Parliament to confer on the High Court or the Court ofappeal, such power of Parliament to confer on the High Court or the Court of Appeal,such powers as Parliament may think fit in relation to the exercise by the High Court orthe Court of Appeal, as the case may be, of its jurisdiction in respect of matters arisingunder this Chapter”.It is perhaps worth remarking that the side note to the whole section reads: “Enforcementof protective provisions.” This is the section which is alleged to have made by necessaryintendment fundamental changes in the long standing rules of law conferring immunityon the judges, on servants of the executive acting on a judge’s warrant, and on the Crownor state, and providing that the state should pay damages in procedures like writ of erroror motion in arrest of judgment. In case, like the present, for committal for contempt theright of appeal was conceded only in 1960.It seems that in Trinidad (Maharaj v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1977] 1All E.R. 411) an appeal always lay by special leave to the Privy Council, and we weretold that a general right of appeal has now been conceded. But, apart form thesequalifications, the right of redress in cases of contempt was limited to application to thecommitting judge for release, or, pre-record.In no case did it extend to damages. True, it admitted action against the Crown (State)for tort. But judicial error is not a tort, and the draftsmen of the act of 1966 were carefullyto exclude liability whether direct ,personal or vicarious for judicial act, and the office ofjudge from the definition of servant of the crown (see section 2 (2) (h) (v) and 4(6). thereis no reference, of course, to judicial immunity for acts contravening the entrenched rightand freedom. But I do not myself believe that this was because no such immunity existed(as must be the case if the majority decision in this case be correct).Personally I find it impossible to believe that, if a right of action for damages in such acase did exist, as the result of the constitution of 1962, either against the judge or againstthe state, the draft man of the act of 1966 would have allowed it to pass silentio, andwould not have made express reference to it. At all events, what is certain is that no such35