By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

these provisions are ordinary and liable to abuse and constitution an infringement to thefreedom of prevision which is guaranteed under act. 18 (1).The fourth issue turns on the freedom of peaceful assembly and public expressionand questions the constitutionality of as 40, 41, 42 and 43 of the Police Force Ordinance,Cap. 322 as well as s. 11 (1) and (2) of the Political Parties Act. These provisions make itnecessary for permits to be obtained in order to hold meetings or organize processionsand also provide for police duties in relation thereto. In the sixth and final issue adeclaration is sought on the constitutionality of the appointment of Zanzibaris to non –Union posts on the Mainland.In my ruling in the preliminary objections I reserved for consideration at thisstage the questions of locus standi cause of action and justiciability and I will proceed todo so before considering the matters set out above.Arguing the questions on locus standi, no doubt with a mind to the common laworthodox position, Mr. Mussa submitted that the petitioner had to show a sufficientinterest in the outcome. He considered this to be implied in Art, 30 (3) of theConstitution. In his view the petitioner had to demonstrated a greater personal interestthan that of the general public, and cited the Nigerian case of Thomas & Ors. V.Olufoseye (1986) LRC (const) 639 in support of his argument.In that case it was held by the Court of Appeal that under s. 6 (6) (b) of the 1979 NigerianConstitution it was necessary for the appellants to establish a sufficient interest inmaintaining the action and this should be a personal interest over and above that of thegeneral public. Ademola, J.C. A said, at p 650:It is also the law as laid down in the (Adesanya) case that, to entitle a person toinvolve judicial power, he must show that either his personal interest willimmediately be or has been adversely affected by the action or that he has sustainedor is in immediate danger of susta – ining an injury is over and above thatof the general public.Basing on this, Mr. Mussa went on to assert that the crusial factor in the petition was thepetitioner himself and not the contents of the petition. Furthermore, he contended thatArt. 26 (2) of the Constitution did not in itself confer locus standi and appeared to readthe provision as if it were not independent in itself.In response Mr. Mbezi argued that standing was certainly conferred on thepetitioner by Art. 26 (2) and that personal interest ( on injury ) did not have to be198