By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

emedy against theCrown was not confined to injunctions. It applied to any formof proceedings and where proceedings were possible by suitng the wrongdoerpersonally then an injunction would be available in same circumstances as otherremedies. If such a position required recontiling with the historic maxim as to theCrown doing no wrong. Then this could be achieved by an approach, which MrRichards endorsed in the course of argument, by saying that, as the Crown coulddo no wrong, the Crown could not be considered to have authorized the doing ofwrong, so the torfosor was not acting with the authority of the Crown. (In thissummary I put on one side the position with regard to a claim for immunity on thebasis of act of state. This is not relevant for present purposes).The difficulty which a plaintiff might have in identifying the appropriate servant ofthe Crown who was the toreadors in in practice was overcome by the Crownnominating the individual responsible for the damage and the lack of resources ofthe defendant did not cause problems since the Treasury would make anexgratia payment of compensation if it was a case where, but for immunity, theCrown would be vicariously liable. In such proceeding , if it was appropriate foran injunction to be granted, there was no reason why this should not be done.It was the cridisms in Adams v Naylor (1946) 2 All Er 241, (1946) AC 543, andthe cases which applied those criticisms, of the practice of the Crown nominatinga defendant who might not have been personally guilty of any tort which wee thecatalysics for the changes which wee brought about by the 1947 Act.571