By Evarist Baimu Nyaga Mawalla - Home

Mr. Kisusi submits further that since the Permanent Labour Tribunal has nowbeen transformed into an Industrial Court, litigation before it being in the nature ofcivil proceedings, where there is no fixed time limit, such civil proceedingsbecome amenable to the Law of Limitation Act, 1971. Of course this will be astrong gound if the Industrial Court is not an administrative tribunal like itspredecessor was. In this connection he has referred us to section 3(1) of theInerpretation of Laws and General Clauses Act, 1972 (Cap.1) which defines theord “court” to mean any court in Tanganyika of competent jurisdiction. We are ofthe firm view that indeed the Industrial Court of Tanzania is a “court” ofcompetent exclusive jurisdiction. This view is founded on the changes in the lawwhereby the Permanent Labour Tribunal was abolished and in its place theIndustria Court was established with power to enforce its decision and mete outpunishment in respect of offences involvingcontempt of court. In thesecircumstances we are satisfied, and we hold, that the applicants had to complywith the law of Limitation Act, 1971 by bringing their litigation before the IndustrialCourt within six years as per paragraph 7 of the First Schedule to the Law ofLimitation Act, 1971. This is so because their litigation is based on contract. Inthe result we hold that the trade dispute which has culminated in theseproceedings was time-barred when it reached the Industrial Court. There wastherefore nothing before the Industrial court to inquire into.The question then boils down to the vires of that Court, namely that it had nojurisdiction to inquire into a nothing, as it were. We would thus allow applicationon this point alone so that an order of certiorari would lie as prayer. Hence and in517