Money and Markets: Essays in Honor of Leland B. Yeager

Leland Yeager’s utilitarianism as a guide to public policy 215the fundamental principle of policy espousal. Yeager’s argument for rulesutilitarianismexplicitly recognizes the argument that one should want to follow therule rather than deviate from it in particular cases, because particular cases arebased on incomplete and possibly biased information, so even when a narrowutilitarian judgment might be that people would be better off violating the rule in aparticular case, this Hayekian-influenced rules utilitarianism still recommendsadhering to the rule. If the fundamental rule is to protect individual rights, thenbased on rules-utilitarian arguments, one might drop any utilitarian argumentswith regard to specific public policy issues and – on utilitarian grounds – supportthe rule of protecting individual rights.Of course, rules-utilitarians might not conclude that this is the rule they arrive atthrough their positive analysis; however, Yeager says he adheres to a pro-rightsdoctrine, so it appears that in this case Yeager’s rules-utilitarianism leads him tothat rule. Yet he is willing to deviate from that rule on utilitarian grounds. “Personalfreedom, while a great value, is not the only value. Quite conceivably, in wretchedcircumstances, people might willingly trade away their freedom ... for more food,clothing, shelter, and safety” (2001: 247). While Yeager himself may see somereason to deviate from always adhering to the policy principle of protectingindividual rights, one can at least construct a utilitarian argument that supports apure rights doctrine as a foundation for policy espousal. Despite rhetoricaldifferences, the policy conclusions reached by a pure natural rights doctrine can bederived from rules-utilitarianism.Yeager’s utilitarian policy espousalYeager makes compelling arguments for his utilitarian position on policy espousal,but the arguments are abstract and theoretical. From my conversations with him,and from reading his work, I believe that Leland and I would agree on most actualpolicy conclusions, yet I find myself unwilling to accept completely his utilitarianjustifications for policy espousal. In this section I will trace through his argumentsand ultimately identify one area of utilitarianism that makes me uncomfortable. Irefer to discomfort here because, recognizing that we are discussing a normativeissue, correct and incorrect do not apply as in positive analysis; yet the way thatwords are used may lead to positive results that violate one’s normative values.While Yeager argues against other alternatives, such as natural rights andcontractarianism, he also notes an affinity for both of these approaches in certainregards. Let me begin with our shared affinity for the protection of rights andindividual freedom, not because utilitarian logic must lead to this conclusion butbecause it has led Yeager there. If we accept liberty as a policy principle onutilitarian grounds, then as noted above, we might promote it to the primary policygoal, not because we axiomatically accept its desirability but because on utilitariangrounds we accept it as a fundamental rule that we are not willing to violate inspecific cases. In this case, for utilitarian reasons, our policy espousal is based on theprinciple of liberty. Yet we see that Yeager does not do this, and admits that theremay be circumstances where people would be willing to trade away some personal