Money and Markets: Essays in Honor of Leland B. Yeager

62 James C. Miller IIIrefusing to accept funds from business, or labor, or other “interest” groups, if theythought such tactics would increase their chances for election.The point is, a regime in which anticompetitive campaign laws and regulationswere eliminated would not degenerate into “the law of the jungle.” To the contrary,political markets would be more orderly and far more responsive to the interests ofthe electorate.Notes1 Chairman of The CapAnalysis Group, an affiliate of the international law firm, HowreySimon Arnold & White, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Study of Public Choiceat George Mason University as well as the university’s Mercatus Center, and SeniorFellow (by courtesy) of the Hoover Institution. This contribution is based on the author’sexpert report submitted to the US Supreme Court in Congressman Ron Paul, et al. v. FederalElection Commission, et al. (2002). Useful comments by William Olson, Parker Normann,and Jeff Eisenach are gratefully acknowledged.2 James C. Miller III (1999). Monopoly Politics. Stanford: Hoover Press.3 Much of this research is in the field of public choice.4 For more on the similarities and differences between commercial markets and politicalmarkets, see Monopoly Politics, Chapters 2–4.5 The following discussion replicates points made in Donald Wittman (1989). WhyDemocracies Produce Efficient Results. Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 1395–424.6 Political parties withdraw their support of candidates – especially incumbents – veryrarely.7 Adam Smith (1937). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. New York:Modern Library, p. 128.8 The analogy in commercial markets should be evident: more desirable location andestablishments, superior product/service line, more effective advertising, and betterreputation.9 There are modest restrictions on use of the frank. See Monopoly Politics, pp. 77–8.10 There are also modest restrictions on the use of these instruments for political purposes.See Monopoly Politics, p. 76.11 When governments join the “digital revolution,” elected officials typically commandeerfor themselves the up-front cost (web pages, e-mail, etc.). See Cindy Crandall and JeffEisenach (1998). The Digital State. Washington: Progress & Freedom Foundation.12 National Taxpayers Union and Federal Election Commission. The point made aboutthe incumbent’s spending on franked mail versus challengers’ campaign spending wasnoted in Steve Symms (1997). Campaign Finance Reform Gainers. Washington Times,13August, p. A14.13 Albert D. Cover and Bruce S. Brumberg (1982). Baby Books and Ballots: The Impactof Congressional Mail on Constituent Opinion. American Political Science Review, 76(2):347–59.14 Norman S. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin (1998). Vital Statistics onCongress, 1997–1998. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.15 Yiannakis found that constituent service is especially effective in attracting supporters ofthe incumbent’s challenger. See Diana Evans Yiannakis (1981). The Grateful Electorate:Casework and Congressional Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 25(3): 568–80.Serra and Cover found that constituent service creates a positive evaluation of theincumbent and has the most impact on constituents where only a small portion of themidentify with the incumbent’s party. See George Serra and Albert D. Cover (1992). TheElectoral Consequences of Perquisite Use: The Casework Case. Legislative StudiesQuarterly, 17: 233–46.