Money and Markets: Essays in Honor of Leland B. Yeager

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Leland Yeager’s utilitarianism as a guide to public policy 219rights. I am unwilling to deviate from this rights principle on utilitarian grounds inparticular cases, for reasons that Yeager and Hayek have articulated well. In asocial setting I understand that I am not a dictator and that other people have thesame rights I do. Thus, I am reluctantly willing to allow them to trade their rightsaway to try to further goals that they believe will enhance their happiness. This doesnot imply my agreement. Even while recognizing people’s right to voluntarily giveup their rights, I will still argue that they should not, based on my indirect utilitarianview of rights. 10The subject matter of this paper is normative, and I believe that most of thedifferences I have with Yeager on its topic are mostly rhetorical. Yet I am concernedthat Yeager’s position does not adequately safeguard individual rights – a goal Iknow he shares with me. Yeager’s utilitarianism appears so broad that one mightargue for almost any public policy based on the conclusion that it would furtherhuman happiness. Of course people could argue the other way based on the effectsof the policies, but then the argument becomes positive, and the normativesuperstructure Yeager has built has little impact.These, then, are my reactions to Leland’s ideas. I close by reaffirming the manyinsights on this topic that I have picked up from Leland, by acknowledging that heis far more an expert on the subject than I, and in this paper in honor of LelandYeager’s 80th birthday, wishing him a happy birthday!Notes1 See McCloskey (1983, 1985), however, who argues that not only do economists not carryout their work in the positive way they describe it, but that economic research is betterbecause it deviates from that positive methodology.2 Positive analysis might also find some beneficial effects from rent controls, such askeeping elderly widows from being evicted from their domiciles due to rising rents, butAlchian and Allen do not mention any results of rent controls that might be consideredbeneficial in their analysis, so their positive analysis points uniformly in one direction.3 Hayek popularized this phrase, which he quoted from eighteenth-century philosopherAdam Ferguson. See Hayek (1948) for his ideas on the subject.4 A similar statement, although not quite as strongly-worded, appears in Yeager (2001:234).5 See Yeager (1994) for his reaction to my book.6 Yeager puts Nozick (1974) and Machan (1975) in this group of rights theorists withimplicitly utilitarian foundations.7 See Holcombe (1994: 186–7) for a further discussion of the similarities betweenutilitarians and contractarians.8 Actually, in Yeager’s example based on Mirrlees’ work, the transfer is so large that itleaves more productive individuals with less income than less productive individuals, butMirrlees (1971) argues that an actual welfare-maximizing tax system would haverelatively flat rates and would give productive people more total income, retaining theincentive to be productive.9 However, I do believe that there are certain inalienable rights, and that people shouldnot be allowed to sell themselves into slavery, for example. If rights begin with the rightto self-ownership, people must retain self-ownership in order to preserve this basis forrights. But exploring this caveat further would take the present argument too far afield.10 The only case in which I would argue for giving up some rights is to help to further
220 Randall G. Holcombeprotect the rights of others, as for example allowing the authority of police and courtsover individuals. See Holcombe (2002: 272–5; 2004) for a further discussion.ReferencesAlchian, Armen A. and William R. Allen (1972). University Economics, 3rd edn. Belmont, CA:Wadsworth.Buchanan, James M. (1975). The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago, IL:University of Chicago Press.Friedman, Milton (1953). The Methodology of Positive Economics. In Essays in PositiveEconomics, Chapter 1. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Hayek, Friedrich A. (1948). Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago, IL: University ofChicago Press.Holcombe, Randall G. (1983). Public Finance and the Political Process. Carbondale: SouthernIllinois University Press.Holcombe, Randall G. (1994). The Economic Foundations of Government. New York: New YorkUniversity Press.Holcombe, Randall G. (2002). From Liberty to Democracy: The Transformation of AmericanGovernment. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Holcombe, Randall G. (2004). Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable. Independent Review,8(3): 325–42.Machan, Tibor (1975). Human Rights and Human Liberties. Chicago, IL: Nelson Hall.McCloskey, Donald M. (1983). The Rhetoric of Economics. Journal of Economic Literature,21(2): 481–517.McCloskey, Donald M. (1985). The Rhetoric of Economics. Madison, WI: University ofWisconsin Press.Mirrlees, James A. (1971). An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation.Review of Economic Studies, 38(April): 175–208.Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.Rothbard, Murray N. (1982). The Ethics of Liberty. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: HumanitiesPress.Samuelson, Paul A. (1956). Social Indifference Curves. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1):1–22.Yeager, Leland B. (1978). Pareto Optimality in Policy Espousal. Journal of Libertarian Studies,2(3): 199–216.Yeager, Leland B. (1985). Rights, Contract, and Utility in Policy Espousal. Cato Journal, 5(1):259–94.Yeager, Leland B. (1994). Review of Randall G. Holcombe, The Economic Foundations ofGovernment. Constitutional Political Economy, 5(1): 123–7.Yeager, Leland B. (2001). Ethics as Social Science. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
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Money and MarketsIn recent decades,
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The Cultural Foundations ofEconomic
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First published 2006by Routledge2 P
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viiiContents9 The genesis of an ide
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ContributorsJürgen G. Backhaus is
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Preface and acknowledgmentsLeland B
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1 A zeal for truthRoger KopplIf the
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A zeal for truth 3kind of decision-
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A zeal for truth 5and attributes to
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A zeal for truth 7“30 years to th
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A zeal for truth 9I have a $10 bank
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A zeal for truth 11conversation, Ye
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A zeal for truth 13a market economy
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A zeal for truth 15of “approval o
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A zeal for truth 17to offer about e
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A zeal for truth 19Klappholz, K. an
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2 The Yeager mystiqueA profile of t
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The Yeager mystique 23students bent
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The Yeager mystique 25Yeager’s pe
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The Yeager mystique 27none, but not
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The Yeager mystique 29demeanor coul
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The Yeager mystique 31wanted to cou
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The Yeager mystique 33The common id
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The Virginia renaissance in politic
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4 LelandA personal appreciationGord
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Leland, a personal appreciation 47I
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Monopoly politics and its unsurpris
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Good ideas and bad regressions 67I
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Good ideas and bad regressions 69am
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Good ideas and bad regressions 71
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Good ideas and bad regressions 73ap
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Good ideas and bad regressions 75Le
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Good ideas and bad regressions 772.
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Good ideas and bad regressions 79pa
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Good ideas and bad regressions 81th
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7 Pluralism, formalism, andAmerican
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Pluralism, formalism, and American
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8 Leland’s favorite economists *J
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Figure 8.1 The “Genealogical Tabl
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Leland’s favorite economists 103o
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Leland’s favorite economists 105e
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Leland’s favorite economists 107O
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Leland’s favorite economists 109S
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Leland’s favorite economists 111A
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Leland’s favorite economists 113v
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Leland’s favorite economists 115w
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Leland’s favorite economists 117n
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circumstances and even acts of will
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Leland’s favorite economists 121c
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Leland’s favorite economists 123D
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Leland’s favorite economists 125G
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The genesis of an idea 127Stuart Mi
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The genesis of an idea 129suggest t
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The genesis of an idea 131macroecon
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The genesis of an idea 133value. Hi
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The genesis of an idea 135half of m
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The genesis of an idea 137Unsettled
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The genesis of an idea 1398 “M. S
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ReferencesThe genesis of an idea 14
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10 The macroeconomics of money,savi
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The macroeconomics of money, saving
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The macroeconomics of money, saving
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Mr. YeagerThe macroeconomics of mon
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11 No-name moneyMaria Minniti and L
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No-name money 153many political lea
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No-name money 155consultants, who f
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No-name money 157bank chose the one
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No-name money 159While inflation in
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No-name money 161was reinforced by
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No-name money 163private ownership,
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No-name money 165Mencinger, Joze (1
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Monetary disequilibrium theory and
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Page 202 and 203: Reflections on reswitching and roun
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Page 224 and 225: Leland Yeager’s utilitarianism as
Page 236 and 237: 15 Ethnic conflict and theeconomics
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Page 252 and 253: NotesEthnic conflict and the econom
Page 258 and 259: The legacy of Bismarck 243War, the
Page 260 and 261: The legacy of Bismarck 245people wo
Page 262 and 263: The legacy of Bismarck 247system, b
Page 264 and 265: The legacy of Bismarck 249Old age i
Page 266 and 267: IndexAckley, G., Macroeconomic Theo
Page 268 and 269: Marshall, A.: approach to economics
Page 270: concerns 10-11, 150; monetarydisequ
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