Money and Markets: Essays in Honor of Leland B. Yeager

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Monopoly politics and its unsurprising effects 63Serra and Moon found that voters respond to constituent service and implied thatconstituent service might be able to offset policy differences between the incumbent andhis or her constituents. See George Serra and David Moon (1994). Casework, IssuePosition, and Voting in Congressional Elections: A District Analysis. Journal of Politics, 56:200–13.16 Morris Fiorina (1981). Some Problems in Studying the Effects of Resource Allocation onCongressional Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 25: 543–67.17 Gerald W. Scully (1995). Congressional Tenure: Myth and Reality. Public Policy,203–19.18 Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers (1994). Congressional Elections and the PorkBarrel. Journal of Politics, 56: 377–99.19 Kenneth N. Bickers and Robert M. Stein (1996). The Electoral Dynamics of the FederalPork Barrel. American Journal of Political Science, 40(4): 1300–26.20 Randall W. Bennett and Christine Loucks (1994). Savings and Loan and FinanceIndustry PAC Contributions to Incumbent Members of the House Banking Committee.Public Choice, 79: 83–104.21 Mark W. Crain and John T. Sullivan (1997). Committee Characteristics and Re-electionMargins: An Empirical Investigation of the U.S. House. Public Choice, 93(3–4): 271–85.22 For example, Loucks found an increase in PAC contributions from appointment to theSenate Banking Committee. Christine Loucks (1996). Finance Industry PAC Contributionsto U.S. Senators, 1983–88. Public Choice, 219–29.Kroszner and Stratmann found that committee members get more money from PACswith an interest in their jurisdictions, and the contributions rise with seniority. RandallS. Kroszner and Thomas Stratmann (1998). Interest Group Competition and theOrganization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services PoliticalAction Committees. American Economic Review, 88(5): 1163–87.Anagnoson found that during election years federal agencies speed up their approvalof grants to the constituents of representatives who are on committees with authorityover them. Theodore Anagnoson (1982). Federal Grant Agencies and CongressionalElection Campaigns. American Journal of Political Science, 26: 547–61.23 Roberts found that the death of Senator Scoop Jackson (then a member of the SenateArmed Services Committee) depressed the prices of stocks of companies in Jackson’sstate and raised the prices of stocks in the home state of his successor. Brian E. Roberts(1990). A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits.American Journal of Political Science, 34(1): 31–58.24 Janet Box-Steffensmeier (1996). A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests inCampaign Strategy. American Journal of Political Science, 352–71.25 Financial activities of house candidates, 1996, FEC (http://www.fedc.gov/1996/dates).26 It is really not necessary to prove motive here. It is the effect of the laws in limitingcompetition, whatever their official or secret rationale.27 For a more thorough examination, see Monopoly Politics, esp. Chapter 5.28 Theodore J. Lowi (1996). A Ticket to Democracy. New York Times, 28 December,p. A27.29 James T. Hamilton and Helen F. Ladd (1996). Biased Ballots?: The Impact of BallotStructure on North Carolina Elections in 1992. Public Choice, 87: 259–80.30 David J. Gopoian and Darrell M. West (1984). Trading Security for Seats: StrategicConsiderations in the Redistricting Process. Journal of Politics, 46: 1080–96.31 Gary King (1989). Representation through Legislative Redistricting: A StochasticModel. American Journal of Political Science, 33(4): 787–824; Janet Campagna and BernardGrofman (1990). Party Control and Partisan Bias in the 1980s CongressionalRedistricting. Journal of Politics, 52(4): 1242–57; and Bruce E. Cain (1985). Assessing thePartisan Effects of Redistricting. American Political Science Review, (79)2: 320–33.32 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976).
64 James C. Miller III33 Peter H. Aranson and Melvin J. Hinich (1979). Some Aspects of the Political Economyof Election Campaign Contribution Laws. Public Choice, 34(5): 435–61.34 Burton A. Abrams and Russell F. Settle (1978). The Economic Theory of Regulationand Public Financing of Presidential Elections. Journal of Political Economy, 86(2): 245–57.35 Bruce Bender (1968). An Analysis of Congressional Voting on Legislation LimitingCongressional Expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 1005–21.36 As quoted in Aranson and Hinich, “Some Aspects,” p. 451.37 See, for example, Aranson and Hinich, “Some Aspects”; Bruce Bender, “An Analysis ofCongressional Voting,” pp. 1005–21; Amihai Glazer (1993). On the Incentives toEstablish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games. Public Choice, 75(2): 139–48; Gary C.Jacobson (1985). Money and Votes Re-considered: Congressional Elections, 1972–82.Public Choice, 47(1): 7–62 and (1990). The Effects of Campaign Spending in HouseElections: New Evidence for Old Arguments. American Journal of Political Science, 34:334–62; Christopher Kenny and Michael McBurnett (1992). A Dynamic Model of theEffect of Campaign Spending on Congressional Vote Choice. American Journal of PoliticalScience, 36(4): 923–37; John R. Lott (1991). Does Additional Campaign Spending ReallyHurt Incumbents?: The Theoretical Importance of Past Investments in Political BrandName. Public Choice, 87–92; John L. Mikesell (1987). A Note on Senatorial Mass MailingExpenditures and the Quest for Reelection. Public Choice, 53: 257–65; Dennis C. Mueller(1989). Public Choice II. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 209–12; K. FilipPalda and Kristian S. Palda (1985). Ceilings on Campaign Spending: Hypothesis andPartial Test with Canadian Data. Public Choice, 45: 313–31; and Thomas J. Scott (1989).Do Incumbent Campaign Expenditures Matter? Journal of Politics, 51: 965–76.38 Jeff Milyo (1998). The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections. Citizens’Research Foundation, University of Southern California, June 1998, p. 27.39 Bradley A. Smith (1997). Why Campaign Finance Reform Never Works. Wall StreetJournal, 19 March, p. A19.40 Under the Act, a newspaper, for example, may make news-story, commentary, andeditorial (in-kind) contributions to a candidate unless the newspaper is owned by thecandidate. However, a supporter of the candidate may purchase a newspaper and runnews-stories, commentaries, and editorials on behalf of the candidate without restraint.41 Section 103 of Title I waives the relevant restraints when the money is to be used toconstruct buildings to house the political parties.42 See, for example, Larry J. Sabato and Glenn R. Simpson (1994). Money Talks, VotersListen. Wall Street Journal, 28 December, p. A12.43 Given the incredible complexity of the campaign laws, challengers justifiably would befearful of even innocent mistakes. Consider, for example, the final regulations and associatedexplanation and justification the FEC promulgated in 9 February 1995 regulatingall expenditures by principal campaign committees designed to prohibit personal use.These regulations run 14 pages, in the Federal Register, are far from clear, and conveythe notion that it is really impossible to write a clear rule, and therefore violations mustbe left to the judgment of the FEC. Given that penalties under the BCRA for knowing orwillful violations involving making, receiving, and reporting contributions or expenditurescan run as high as $25,000 and imprisonment of up to five years, novice would-bechallengers might opt never to run for office.44 Because of my experience in government, I am aware of the deference the courts affordCongress. But the instances with which I am aware go to broad policy issues. In theseinstances, the law is brazen in its uneven treatment of those competing for the privilegeof representing us: one set of rules for incumbents, another (less desirable) set forchallengers.45 See Monopoly Politics, p. 116.46 Various matters trigger the requirement to file as a candidate, such as raising or spendingover $5,000.
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Money and MarketsIn recent decades,
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The Cultural Foundations ofEconomic
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First published 2006by Routledge2 P
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viiiContents9 The genesis of an ide
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ContributorsJürgen G. Backhaus is
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Preface and acknowledgmentsLeland B
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1 A zeal for truthRoger KopplIf the
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A zeal for truth 3kind of decision-
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A zeal for truth 5and attributes to
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A zeal for truth 7“30 years to th
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A zeal for truth 9I have a $10 bank
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A zeal for truth 11conversation, Ye
Page 28 and 29: A zeal for truth 13a market economy
Page 30 and 31: A zeal for truth 15of “approval o
Page 32 and 33: A zeal for truth 17to offer about e
Page 34 and 35: A zeal for truth 19Klappholz, K. an
Page 36 and 37: 2 The Yeager mystiqueA profile of t
Page 38 and 39: The Yeager mystique 23students bent
Page 40 and 41: The Yeager mystique 25Yeager’s pe
Page 42 and 43: The Yeager mystique 27none, but not
Page 44 and 45: The Yeager mystique 29demeanor coul
Page 46 and 47: The Yeager mystique 31wanted to cou
Page 48 and 49: The Yeager mystique 33The common id
Page 50 and 51: The Virginia renaissance in politic
Page 60 and 61: 4 LelandA personal appreciationGord
Page 62 and 63: Leland, a personal appreciation 47I
Page 64 and 65: Monopoly politics and its unsurpris
Page 82 and 83: Good ideas and bad regressions 67I
Page 84 and 85: Good ideas and bad regressions 69am
Page 86 and 87: Good ideas and bad regressions 71
Page 88 and 89: Good ideas and bad regressions 73ap
Page 90 and 91: Good ideas and bad regressions 75Le
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Page 94 and 95: Good ideas and bad regressions 79pa
Page 96 and 97: Good ideas and bad regressions 81th
Page 98 and 99: 7 Pluralism, formalism, andAmerican
Page 100 and 101: Pluralism, formalism, and American
Page 114 and 115: 8 Leland’s favorite economists *J
Page 116 and 117: Figure 8.1 The “Genealogical Tabl
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Leland’s favorite economists 113v
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Leland’s favorite economists 115w
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Leland’s favorite economists 117n
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circumstances and even acts of will
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Leland’s favorite economists 121c
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Leland’s favorite economists 123D
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Leland’s favorite economists 125G
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The genesis of an idea 127Stuart Mi
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The genesis of an idea 129suggest t
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The genesis of an idea 131macroecon
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The genesis of an idea 133value. Hi
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The genesis of an idea 135half of m
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The genesis of an idea 137Unsettled
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The genesis of an idea 1398 “M. S
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ReferencesThe genesis of an idea 14
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10 The macroeconomics of money,savi
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The macroeconomics of money, saving
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The macroeconomics of money, saving
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Mr. YeagerThe macroeconomics of mon
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11 No-name moneyMaria Minniti and L
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No-name money 153many political lea
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No-name money 155consultants, who f
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No-name money 157bank chose the one
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No-name money 159While inflation in
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No-name money 161was reinforced by
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No-name money 163private ownership,
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No-name money 165Mencinger, Joze (1
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Monetary disequilibrium theory and
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Reflections on reswitching and roun
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14 Leland Yeager’s utilitarianism
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Leland Yeager’s utilitarianism as
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15 Ethnic conflict and theeconomics
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Ethnic conflict and the economics o
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NotesEthnic conflict and the econom
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The legacy of Bismarck 243War, the
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The legacy of Bismarck 245people wo
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The legacy of Bismarck 247system, b
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The legacy of Bismarck 249Old age i
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IndexAckley, G., Macroeconomic Theo
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Marshall, A.: approach to economics
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concerns 10-11, 150; monetarydisequ
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