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eigned 1801-25) was part of his general reorganizationof the central government, which included as well thesetting up of the council of state (1810) and the replacementof the 'colleges' by ministries (1802, 1811). Tothe council of state he entrusted the task of preparinglegislation, a task undertaken in the previous hundredyears in part by the senate, in part by the 'colleges,' inpart by special commissions. The council of state hadno representative element in it, but was simply anothercog in the bureaucratic machine, being composed of theemperor's nominees, varying from thirty-five to sixtypersons, with a large subordinate staff. It did not havethe right of initiating legislative proposals; its recommendationswere purely advisory; and the emperorshad no qualms either about acting upon the minorityopinion or about promulgating decrees without consultationwith it. Nevertheless the council did muchnecessary and efficient work, and it continued in existenceuntil the 1905 Revolution, when it was transformed intothe second chamber of the new parliament (see p. 69).Alexander's third great reform involved the definitiveconversion of the 'colleges' into ministerial departments,each headed by one minister, appointed by and solelyresponsible to the tsar, with the key-right of personalreport to him. The organization and procedure of eachdepartment were governed by revised and thoroughregulations. At the same time a committee of ministerswas instituted to secure co-ordination. This committee,however, was to function on the Napoleonic rather thanon the English model, which had earlier found favourin Alexander's inner circle of advisers. The ministersdid not form a ministry: they were not collectivelyresponsible, and they often had widely divergent oreven radically opposed views. Thus the committee ofministers was a very weak means of co-ordinating policy,and in this respect was usually of secondary importance.After the creation of the Duma, in 1906, the committee,reconstituted as the council, of ministers was of far moreconsequence, and Stolypin as its president (1906-11)wielded something like the powers of a prime minister,thanks to his forceful personality. Yet it remained to