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compactly Polish lands), encouraged Dmowski andmany Poles to choose as the lesser evil temporary collaborationagainst the common enemy with Russia, whereit was hoped that the liberal and revolutionary movementsmight extract from the government concessions toPoland.The 1905 Revolution did extract concessions; butPolish hopes of any material change in the Russianregime were dashed when reaction set in again after1907 and withdrew or emasculated most of the reformsundertaken. The tsarist government still further antagonizedPolish feeling when in 1912 it separated from' Congress Poland' the district of Kholm, a battlegroundbetween Poles and Ukrainians, Uniats and Orthodox,the first and only alteration of the frontiers of ' CongressPoland' since 1815.The outbreak of the war in 1914 found the Polesnecessarily divided. The response of the Russian Poleswas far more favourable than might have been expected,in part thanks to a moving proclamation issued underthe signature of the commander-in-chief, the grand-dukeNicholas. But reactionary Russian nationalism remainedthe dominant influence with the tsar, and, despitediscreet pressure from France and Great Britain, nothingof any value could be extracted from him in favour ofPoland. On the other hand, though both the liberal andthe revolutionary parties in Russia were prepared torecognize the freedom of ethnographic Poland (as theydid after the Revolution of March 1917), they did notinterpret this as including any large part of ' the westernlands.' Meanwhile, by 1917 most of these and all' Congress Poland' had. been conquered by the CentralPowers. But for their conflicting rivalries they mighthave presented the Allies with the fait accompli of anAustro-German solution of the Polish question. Asit was, Pilsudski proved right in the judgment attributedto him in the summer of 1914: "The Polishquestion will be decided in our favour if Germany isvictorious against Russia, but is herself defeated byFrance."221