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and giving it a pro-French orientation, and he was intouch with French financial circles who were anxious torenew the close links of Russia with the Paris moneymarket that had subsisted under the Second Empire.Official overtures even came during the Boulanger crisisfrom the French government. Alexander III wanted theFrench to be strong, "nous avons besoin de vous etvous avez besoin de nous." But Boulangism and theprinciples and practice of the Third Republic disgustedhim. Katkov overshot the mark. Giers succeeded inrenewing links with Berlin.Nevertheless, five years later there was no treaty withGermany, and there was alliance with France. Thereasons for it have already been indicated. Unlike theTriple Alliance and the Austro-German alliance, whichwere never supplemented by detailed military agreements,that between Russia and France was not formally a treaty,and the heart of it was from the first a military convention,revised and extended in 1900-1 and between 1906 and1914.The essentials were: (i) Russia and France wouldfight together if either were attacked by Germany, or byAustria-Hungary or Italy supported by Germany; (ii)the two general staffs were to meet annually to concertjoint measures; (iii) the two governments "will takecounsel together" on every question likely to jeopardizethe general peace, and in the event of being threatenedby aggression "undertake to reach an understanding" onthe necessary measures; (iv) the object of the alliance,originally defined as the maintenance of peace, wasextended in 1899 to include the maintenance "of theequilibrium between the European powers"; (v) theterms (though not the fact of the existence) of the alliancewere to be kept strictly secret; and they were.The diplomatic terms of the alliance were vague andled to divergence of interpretation. The French, downto 1912, were very cautious as to the casus fcederis arisingout of the Balkans, and the Russians were similarlycautious as to Morocco. Thus during the 1908-9Bosnian crisis the French did not consider that "thevital interests of France and Russia are menaced," and430

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