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and by the fact that the Russian military did not in factat that time have designs on Herat or Afghanistan; in1904 by the restraint of the Balfour government and bythe patent fact that, however furiously Nicholas II mightinveigh against "the insolent conduct of England" and"our filthy enemies," he could not afford to drive theminto his alarmingly unsuccessful war with Japan.Russian foreign policy in its opposition to British wasmuch strengthened by the similar opposition of Frenchpolicy. Already in 1887 Russian and French diplomacymade common cause against the British plans for Egypt.The Franco-Russian alliance, as has been seen, in itsfirst period (1893-1904) functioned primarily againstGreat Britain. One result for the time being was thechange in the balance of power in the Mediterranean,By then Russia had created a Black Sea fleet, and from1894 a small Russian squadron reappeared in the Mediterranean.The French navy was second in strength to theBritish, and, even if it were not combined with the Russianfleet sallying through the Straits, challenged superiorityin the Mediterranean. The weakness of British seapowerwas a major issue for government and the publicalike. Only with the return of the Salisbury governmentto power in 1895 did large naval programmes slowly reestablishnaval supremacy. Even so, the nineties markedtwo important changes in the British attitude towardsRussia and Turkey.The Armenian massacres (1895-96) gave the coup derdce to the strength of British Turcophil opinion, whichC ad for twenty years been powerfully countered byGladstonian liberalism. Now the Turk became 'theunspeakable Turk' and the sultan 'Abdul Hamid theDamned.' Their conduct was the worse in that theyspent their money on fortifying the Dardanelles but notthe Bosphorus, and seemed prepared to accept Russianascendancy in Constantinople. Salisbury, always veryconscious of public opinion in foreign affairs, abandonedthe threadbare principle of the integrity of the Ottomanempire and broached partition. He was the moreinclined to this by the fact that one keystone of Britishpolicy towards Russia, the protection of Constantinople437