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Proceedings in pdf format. - Sociotechnical Systems Engineering ...

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<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly important, as electronic transaction systemshave become widespread <strong>in</strong> use.All services may be needed at every stage, given therequirements of various services and applications,rang<strong>in</strong>g from e-commerce applications that use protocolsat high layers to connection privacy and l<strong>in</strong>k availabilityat low layer protocols.DEFENCE-IN-DEPTH STRATEGYLast concepts of security approaches <strong>in</strong> securitydoma<strong>in</strong> are based on so called defence-<strong>in</strong>-depth strategywhich states that all <strong>in</strong><strong>format</strong>ion technology assets with<strong>in</strong>a protected network need to have the necessary amountof security protection to guard aga<strong>in</strong>st direct attacks atwhatever level the asset resides with<strong>in</strong> the network(Security Certified Program 2006).The ma<strong>in</strong> idea is to protect <strong>in</strong><strong>format</strong>ion at all stages itis be<strong>in</strong>g used and retransmitted <strong>in</strong> terms of provision ofone or more of the security services.Defence-<strong>in</strong>-depth strategy centres on ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gappropriate security measures and procedures (provid<strong>in</strong>gdescribed security services) at five different levels with<strong>in</strong>environment (Ashley 2006):• Perimeter (entry po<strong>in</strong>ts to the network);• Network (enterprise data transmission network);• Host (workstation or server);• Application (any application runn<strong>in</strong>g on host);• Data (data storage protection).This strategy allows address<strong>in</strong>g the majority of threatsto security due to solutions used at essential <strong>in</strong><strong>format</strong>ionprocess<strong>in</strong>g stages.From the other side, defence-<strong>in</strong>-depth strategy andsecure network architecture oriented approaches are likepatches – they try to protect network (resources and<strong>in</strong><strong>format</strong>ion stored) from some def<strong>in</strong>ed threats (mostlypredef<strong>in</strong>ed) us<strong>in</strong>g specific products or techniques. Themajority of networks historically have heterogeneousenvironments, thus <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g great problem to solutionmanagement and consolidation. Separated, often isolatedproducts address<strong>in</strong>g only specific threats cannot provide<strong>in</strong>tegrated security, allow<strong>in</strong>g unaddressed threats orthreats to newly discovered (and thus unaddressed)vulnerabilities still are possible.Evaluation of effectiveness of security measures be<strong>in</strong>gused <strong>in</strong> most cases is hard to accomplish. This is becausethere are no mechanisms to control <strong>in</strong>teraction andeffectiveness of security techniques used and nomechanism is used to address new threats andvulnerabilities except published software patches andfixes.In most cases even these manufacturer providedcritical updates could not be easily applied <strong>in</strong> productionenvironment because the effect of apply<strong>in</strong>g such updates<strong>in</strong> most cases is not predictable.As environment changes, some new threats appearand some old disappear. Risk analysis should beperiodically performed and security systems should bechanged reflect<strong>in</strong>g environment changes for securitysystems to be able to provide the same level of protectionand be able to correctly act <strong>in</strong> new conditions (for<strong>in</strong>stance, changes <strong>in</strong> security procedure or firewallconfiguration reflect<strong>in</strong>g new IT technology <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong>organization).Therefore, by the nature, defence-<strong>in</strong>-depth strategybased on secure network architecture fails to guarantee<strong>in</strong>tegrated security, because, first, for problem solv<strong>in</strong>g ituses different solutions often with poor consolidation.Second, system that realizes protection from specificthreats is as secure, as complete threat <strong>in</strong>ventory wasperformed dur<strong>in</strong>g design phase (which almost always issubjective). In any case, there still is possibility that allpossible threats and potential vulnerabilities will never bediscovered.Thus, approach to network security based on “securearchitecture” with defence-<strong>in</strong>-depth strategy could notprovide necessary level of protection. Such approachtypes does not exam<strong>in</strong>e correct solution <strong>in</strong>teraction on allOSI layers and periodic vulnerabilities <strong>in</strong> protocols andprimitives used.NEED FOR STANDARDIEZED SECURITYMODELTechnologies such as firewalls, <strong>in</strong>trusion detectionsystems, and antivirus software have become extremelypopular <strong>in</strong> the security doma<strong>in</strong>. They however only solvevery specific problems and <strong>in</strong> no means provide securityassurance. Instead, their importance has beenoveremphasised, or rather: other aspects of systemsecurity have been neglected or have received<strong>in</strong>sufficient attention. Security features are oftenimplemented because of a direct threat. <strong>Systems</strong> aredesigned with functionality and efficiency <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d butoften fail to make a thorough <strong>in</strong>vestigation of the securityrequirements of the application as well as the underly<strong>in</strong>gsystem. This <strong>in</strong>evitably leads to patches or securitysoftware or hardware be<strong>in</strong>g used at later stages of thedevelopment cycle, often after vulnerability has beenexploited.This lack of coord<strong>in</strong>ation between securityrequirements and security measures might lie with thefact that there are currently no clearly def<strong>in</strong>ed guidel<strong>in</strong>esas to the requirements of the <strong>in</strong>dividual parts of a system.Many organisations such as f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>stitutions haveclearly def<strong>in</strong>ed bus<strong>in</strong>ess requirements. However, thesebus<strong>in</strong>ess requirements have little relation to thespecification and the implementation of the system. Thisclearly <strong>in</strong>dicates that some process is required toformalise the implementation of a secure system andachieve a state of security assurance.Annual <strong>Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> of Vidzeme University College “ICTE <strong>in</strong> Regional Development”, 2006128

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