STRUCTURES OF VIOLENCE

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| Structures of Violence
before it. Despite being summoned by the Pandian
Commission the SOG/CRPF “refused to subject
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themselves to cross-examination”.
The commission opined that a total of three personnel
of the SOG and four personnel of the CRPF including
ASI of the SOG, Ashok Kumar and Commander R.P
Roy of the CRPF deliberately came out of the camp
with fully loaded militarized weapons and
indiscriminately red, a total of twenty rounds of
ammunition, on a procession that included children
and seniors. The protest, which originated at Brari
Angan reached Brakpora after passing through fourarmy
check posts including ones at Utrasoo,
Khundroo and Bulbul-Nowgam on route to Brakpora,
all at a distance of around one kilometer from each
other. Eyewitnesses saw the protest being monitored
closely by twenty to twenty ve policemen who were
at the end of the procession, including the SHO of
Achabal, who tailed the procession from Khundroo
onwards for a distance of about four kilometers.
Moreover, of the eight persons killed, four were shot in
the heads, three in the chest and one in the abdomen
suggesting that the CRPF/SOG red at them with the
intention of killing them in stark contrast to the
”accidental ring” defense mounted by the
SOG/CRPF, which apparently took place while some
“unknown masked gunmen from within the crowd”
red at the Camp while protestors turned “belligerent”
and tried to “forcibly snatch ries” from the
SOG/CRPF personnel when their ries “got
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automatically red” . Yet, it is understood that none
of the SOG/CRPF personnel were injured in this
“ring” or by “belligerent” acts of the protestors.
SHO Achabal says in in his testimony to the Pandian
Commission that “the reasons for such ring might
have been to curb demands for exhumation of the
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deceased [in Pathribal]“ . This is in light of the fact
that the entire village of the families of the Jumma
Khans had protested at the ofce of Deputy
Commissioner, Anantnag and led an application for
the exhumation of the bodies of the ve persons killed
th
on the 28 of March, 2000, three days after the
encounter, when coincidentally, according to the
villagers, four more persons had been abducted from
Brari Angan by the 7 RR Camp at Khundroo but had to
be released because of public protests of the locals.
Critique
The Chittisinghpora, Pathribal and Brakpora cases
are part of a chain reaction set off by the massacre of
thirty-six Sikhs by armed gunmen following which the
army and police joined forces to plan a criminal
conspiracy to massacre ve civilians in an
“encounter” and frame them as “foreign militants”
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responsible for Chittisinghpora. The CRPF and
SOG then massacred eight more civilians who were
part of a procession demanding justice for the
Pathribal killings. Till date the government has not
ordered a single high-level inquiry into the massacre
at Chittisinghpora. Instead the police arrested two
Pakistani nationals, on the familiar hypothesis of them
being the “Pakistani militants” responsible for the
massacre. In both Chittisinghpora and Pathribal, the
state and its agencies including the armed forces and
the police tried to falsely implicate persons who had
no connection with the incidents whatsoever. The
unwillingness of the state agencies to even conduct a
proper inquiry into the Chittisinghpora massacre
raises questions as to who the perpetrators are and
why they are being shielded.
In Pathribal, while the CBI accepted that other
personnel of 7RR were involved, only ve personnel
were charge-sheeted, including the Commanding
Ofcer of the 7 RR Camp at Khundroo. However, a
cursory reading of the charge sheet suggests that at
least two columns of troops of the Petha-Dayalgam
and Chatargul companies and “subordinate staff” of
the 7 RR were involved, directly or indirectly in
operation 'Swift'. The CBI in the report says that
“though the matter was pursued, thereafter, the 7 RR
/Army did not make available the names and details of
other personnel of the 7 RR who participated in the
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said encounter on 25.03.2000” . Despite this, there
are at least ve army ofcers whose role in the 'fake
encounter' is clear from the report but who are not
chargesheeted, they are: Captain S.S. Pathania, who
signed the contrived “Issue Voucher” that
accompanied the arms/ammunition-ve AK-47 ries
and twelve magazines “recovered” from the
“militants” and handed over to the police; Captain
Puneet Dutta who sent a “Situation Report” on the
encounter in the early morning to Victor Force
detailing “recoveries” from the 'foreign militants',
Colonel I.J Peoples who sent the “After Action Report”
to the Head Quarters, Victor Force highlighting
“numerous sightings of terrorists, including some in
combat dresses…especially on the previous evening
of the operation” and Brigadier Deepak Bajaj, who
SSP Farooq Khan states was the person who
informed him of the encounter. The CBI, however, has
limited the case to only ve army ofcials.
More pertinently, the CBI, ultimately, did not chargesheet
any ofcials of the Jammu and Kashmir police,
whether Inspector Mukesh Kumar whose
interrogation of Mohammad Yaqoob Wagay formed
the basis of the 'intelligence' used to front the 'fake
encounter', or SSP Farooq Khan, almost entirely on
the denial of these police personnel of their
involvement in the incident, this despite testimony
incriminating the police from the families of the
victims. For example, Abdul Rashid Khan, son of
Jumma Khan, killed in the 'fake encounter' at
173 Report of the 'One Man Commission of Inquiry' of Justice S.R Pandian on the Firing Event at Brakpora/Bulbul Nowgam (Anantnag) on
3rd April, 2000.
174 Ibid
175 Report of the 'One Man Commission of Inquiry' of Justice S.R Pandian on the Firing Event at Brakpora/Bulbul Nowgam (Anantnag) on
3rd April, 2000.
176 Final Report of the CBI led with the Special Magistrate, CBI, Srinagar under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure.
177 Final Report of the CBI led with the Special Magistrate, CBI, Srinagar under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure.