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STRUCTURES OF VIOLENCE

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CHAPTER 4: ALLEGED PERPETRATORS - AGENTS <strong>OF</strong> <strong>VIOLENCE</strong><br />

126 | Structures of Violence<br />

Part A: Introduction<br />

This chapter serves as an illustration of the violence<br />

faced by the people of Jammu and Kashmir at the<br />

hands of specically identied armed forces<br />

personnel.<br />

This chapter documents 333 case studies of enforced<br />

disappearances, extra-judicial killings, sexual<br />

violence and torture and is a result of many years of<br />

documentation. The starting point has been the<br />

Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society publication<br />

“Informative Missive” that has over the years collated<br />

numerous case studies and stories of human rights<br />

violations. With a focus on cases where there were<br />

identied accused persons, IPTK and APDP<br />

approached the family members of the victims and the<br />

government, armed forces and judicial/quasi-judicial<br />

institutions for the ofcial record on these cases. In a<br />

context where any and all public access to information<br />

on cases is limited, IPTK and APDP deemed it<br />

necessary to use the State's own mechanisms – for<br />

example the court, or the “Right to Information” [RTI]<br />

statutes – to access the State version on each of<br />

these crimes.<br />

Due to limited resources, not all families could be<br />

contacted. In addition, there is a continued fear of<br />

speaking against the State. While many of the families<br />

contacted have provided testimony along with full<br />

self-identication, some witnesses requested<br />

anonymity while others chose not to have their<br />

testimonies recorded and/or used at all. In the case<br />

studies, where testimony has been provided by a<br />

witness – signed and consented – it has been so<br />

indicated.<br />

The RTI Act has been used across these cases.<br />

Jammu and Kashmir has a separate RTI Act of 2009<br />

and a separate Information Commission as well. The<br />

Indian law of 2005 applies to the Government of India<br />

ministries/authorities. RTI applications have broadly<br />

been either case specic OR on broader issues that<br />

pertain to all human rights violations in Jammu and<br />

Kashmir.<br />

RTI was led to the Jammu and Kashmir police on<br />

First Information Reports [FIR] in cases where FIR<br />

details were available and the investigation record<br />

and status of investigations were sought. The FIR is<br />

the starting point of a police investigation and is a<br />

record of information received of a commission of a<br />

crime. It is on this FIR that the police begin their<br />

investigations. In a majority of cases the Jammu and<br />

Kashmir police do not le FIRs. This is either due to<br />

the fear of the armed forces, as the armed forces have<br />

overarching authority and control and they can direct<br />

the police accordingly, or because the Jammu and<br />

Kashmir police is itself involved in the crime, or, as is<br />

often the case, because the police assists the<br />

accused armed forces in ensuring that there is no<br />

accountability for their actions. The police are<br />

instrumental in ensuring that human rights violations<br />

are covered up. This chapter has numerous examples<br />

of such cases where there is no FIR. In addition,<br />

families themselves have felt unable to approach the<br />

police to le the FIR – due to fear of the police<br />

themselves and the accused forces involved [though<br />

this does not excuse the police as they could le the<br />

FIR themselves on receipt of information of a crime<br />

committed]. The information received, and referred to<br />

in each case study where relevant, highlights both the<br />

modus operandi of the armed forces [for example,<br />

extra-judicial killings are often termed as “encounters”<br />

as is evident by comparing the FIRs with the family<br />

testimony and on occasion with the subsequent police<br />

investigations], and the manner in which the State<br />

institutions - primarily the police – have protected the<br />

armed forces [or for that matter themselves]. In cases<br />

where FIRs have been led, the police have only<br />

rarely carried out proper and fair investigations and<br />

have mostly closed the cases as untraced.<br />

RTI was led to the Jammu and Kashmir High Court<br />

on petition numbers in cases where petitions were<br />

led by the victim families and the entire case record<br />

and status were sought. The High Court has over the<br />

years become a repository of the human rights<br />

violations in Jammu and Kashmir as it was often seen<br />

as the rst and last resort for relief. Therefore,<br />

information was sought from the High Court on the<br />

petitions led, responses of the State and orders<br />

passed. The information received, and referred to in<br />

each case study where relevant, illustrates that in<br />

Jammu and Kashmir the judiciary has chosen not to<br />

confront the armed forces and the larger Indian State<br />

project of control and occupation despite having the<br />

constitutional powers to do so. Strong and effective<br />

orders that could have at least minimized the effects of<br />

violence have rarely been passed. When passed, and<br />

ignored by the armed forces, the High Court does not<br />

ensure implementation. But the High Court<br />

proceedings themselves [irrespective of nal orders]<br />

serve as indictments. Whether by the responses of<br />

the armed forces or government ministries, or by<br />

judicial enquiries ordered by the High Court, the case<br />

against the alleged perpetrators is prima facie<br />

established.<br />

In addition to the above specic RTIs, broader areas<br />

were identied and information was sought, as<br />

follows:<br />

• Sanction for Prosecution under the Armed<br />

Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Power Act,<br />

1990 [AFSPA] [Annexure 6]. The fundamental<br />

problem in Jammu and Kashmir is not draconian<br />

laws such as AFSPA. It is instead the political<br />

control that the Indian State has sought to maintain<br />

over Jammu and Kashmir, through the armed

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