STRUCTURES OF VIOLENCE

72
| Structures of Violence
The 'operation' had been “planned” on 23 February
1991 after the 68 Brigade was “informed and
clearance [for the 'cordon and search'] was
obtained” on basis of information from a “source” in
18
February that “there were militants” in the villages
in light of the fact that the village had “a history of
19
sheltering militants” . The General Ofcer
Commanding of the Division was also “briefed on
20
how the operation would be carried out” . Though
such 'operations' were frequent, the 'cordon and
search operation' on the 23/24 of February was the
21
“rst…all night operation” undertaken in the area .
On the 23 February, 1991, the Commanding Ofcer
of the 4 Rajputana Ries, conducted a “brieng” with
the personnel from four companies the 4 Rajputana
Ries during which he delegated two companies-
Alpha and Delta- to lay down the “cordon” where as
two others-Bravo and Charlie- were put in “charge”
22
of “search and recovery” . The Alpha, Bravo,
Charlie and Delta companies were led by Major
23 24
Jatarana, Major Hoshiar Singh , Major Ashok
25 26
Mathur and Major Mahesh Mathur respectively,
who in turn were “keeping in touch” with the
27
Commanding Ofcer via “wireless” the entire
duration of the 'operation' while Colonel K.S Dalal
was accompanying the personnel and supervising
the 'operation' on the ground while “moving ”
28
between the 'cordon' and 'search' parties.
Also “directed by the Commanding Ofcer” to
“accompany” the 'cordon and search operation' was
the Regimental Medical Ofcer, Captain Shyam
29
Sunder . Capt. Shyam Sunder was given an
overview of the 'operation' and its structure on the
30
evening of 23 February .As per the statements of
the personnel, each Company was further divided
into a certain number of columns; for example
Charlie Company “leading” the search was divided
31
into three “columns” headed by the [name illegible] ,
Naib Subedar Sukhi Ram and Second Lieutenant
32
Raghuraj .
The companies left their base at the Trehgam Camp
at around 9 pm and reached the Trehgam Police
Station at 11 pm where Naib Subedar Mool Chand
was sent to get “police assistance” from the Station
33
House Ofcer [SHO], Police Station Trehgam .
Head Constable's Abdul Gani and Bashir Ahmad,
both residents of Kunan-Poshpora accompanied the
army personnel on foot from there onwards. Both the
police ofcers left the police station in uniform along
with the army after entries were made in concerned
registers as part of the protocol of the local police to
34
“assist” the army in such 'operations' .
At Trehgam, four kilometers from Kunan-Poshpora,
the companies “got down from vehicles” and “went
by foot” reaching the “periphery” of Kunan-Poshpora
35
at 1 a.m. Upon reaching the villages, it then took
the army “an hour” to “deploy and link up” their
various “columns” following which at around 2 a.m.
the Alpha and Delta companies “cordoned off the
village” with explicit orders that “no one [be] allowed
to move in or out” of the village while “jawans were
sent to houses for search”. On foot, the army
personnel lit the way carrying large battery powered
18 Section 161 statement of [name illegible], part of the 'cordon and search operation' conducted by 4 Rajputana Ries. Our researchers
have access to poorly photocopied versions of the statements. Therefore, certain names are illegible.
19 'Condential Report of Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir on Incident at Kunan Poshpora, Kupwara.’
20 This shines light on the question of Command Responsibility in the mass rape and torture at Kunan Poshpora. The General Ofcer
Commanding [GOC] is in charge of an entire division of the infantry and represents the highest level of command within it. The 4
Rajputana Ries, a part of the infantry wing of the Indian Army falls under the Command of the GOC, Dragmulla Division. There are 7
General Ofcer's Commanding in the XV Corps of the Indian Army; to read more about army structure and Command Responsibility in
Kashmir, see Chapter 1 of this report.
21 Ibid
22 Section 161 statement of Captain Ranjan Mahajan, part of the 'cordon and search operation' conducted by the 4 Rajputana Ries.
23 Ibid
24 Section 161 statement of [name illegible], part of the 'cordon and search operation' conducted by 4 Rajputana Ries.
25 Section 161 statement of Havaldar Mansa Ram, part of the 'cordon and search operation' conducted by the 4 Rajputana Ries.
26 Section 161 statement of Subedar Laxman Singh, part of the 'cordon and search operation' conducted by the 4 Rajputana Ries.
27 Section 161 statement of Ghan Shyam Singh, part of the 'cordon and search operation' 4 Rajputana Ries. This is also corroborated in
the statements of the survivors of rape to our researchers.
28 Section 161 statement of Major R Khullar, 4 Rajputana Ries part of the 'cordon and search operation'.
29 Section 161 statement of Captain Shyam Sunder, part of the 'cordon and search operation' conducted by the 4 Rajputana Ries.
30 Ibid
31 Our researchers have access to poorly photocopied versions of the statements. Therefore, certain names are illegible.
32 Section 161 statement of [name illegible], part of the 'cordon and search operation' conducted by the 4 Rajputana Ries.
33 Section 161 statement of Captain Ranjan Mahajan, part of the 'cordon and search operation' conducted by the 4 Rajputana Ries.
34 Section 6, Naga People's Movement versus The Union of India in the Supreme Court of India on 27 November 1997. A 'List of Do's and
Dont's' issued by the Army Headquarters was presented by the Attorney General before the Court. According to the Court, “the
instructions contained in the said list which must be followed while acting under Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 are in these
terms:
(a) Act only in the area declared 'Disturbed Area' under Section 3 of the Act.
(b) Power to open re using force or arrest is to be exercised under this Act only by an ofcer/JCO/WO and NCO.
(c) Before launching any raid/search, denite information about the activity to be obtained from the local civil authorities.
(d) As far as possible co-opt representative of local civil administration during the raid.”
35 While army personnel, in multiple statements, say that they reached the Trehgam Police Station at 11 pm and then reached the Kunan-
Poshpora villages at 2 am, this is contradicted by statements of both the victims of torture and of rape who say that they saw the army in
the village at around 10:30 or 11 pm. The army version is also contradicted by the statement of Head Constable Abdul Gani, who in his
161 Statement to the police says that he “reached [his] home at Kunan-Poshpora at 11pm.”