STRUCTURES OF VIOLENCE

16
| Structures of Violence
Further, they spoke of their inability to move on from their
history as individuals who served the interests of
government agencies against their own people. A number
of these gunmen, particularly in the Pattan area, were
subsequently killed, either by militants or the armed
forces themselves. We hold that the Indian State must
also accept responsibility for these deaths.
In another particularly destructive, and patently illegal,
form of violent action, agents of the State also attacked
the non-combatant families of militants. In the case of
Palhallan army camp there was overwhelming evidence
that the armed forces at the camp used these families as
human shields by forcing them to sleep at the camp. In
both Islamabad and Pattan there were consistent reports
of the torture of families of militants. In fact, arrest,
detention and torture of families were the standard
operating procedure of the army in their war against
militants. Further, whether in Pattan or Islamabad,
collective punishment was used as a tactic to subjugate
people, particularly if they were thought to be anti-India. In
Islamabad, entire areas, for example, Cheeni Chowk,
Malakhnag, Mehman Mohalla, were burnt down. In
Pattan there were mass and indiscriminate attacks such
as the army ring on civilians on 1 August 1990 which led
to numerous deaths in Pattan. Unsurprisingly, these
incidents are now part of collective memory and are
spoken of in the same terms as are used for the 1991
Kunan Poshpora mass rape and torture or the 1993
Sopore massacre.
The presence of military camps also reshaped the
economy of entire areas. Whether through encouraging
particular kinds of business around the camps, or
contracts with local businessman, the armed forces
ensured their dominant presence in the everyday
economy of Jammu and Kashmir. Such dominance
allows them to exert a “soft” though highly effective
pressure to further their ends. The effects of this sort of
invasion do not form a direct part of this report but crop up
in the testimonies, particularly in the experience of the
shopkeepers near the Khanabal army camp. In Jammu
and Kashmir, business with—and for—the army is also a
weapon of war.
There is much to be learned even from such an initial
survey of the forms of violence in Jammu and Kashmir:
studying the footprint and practices of the military is to
learn not only about the infrastructure of state violence but
also about the visceral response of the people who are
subjugated by this infrastructure. An understanding of
how the armed forces operate makes it clear that the
violence superseded [and continues to supersede] any of
the formal structures – the Judiciary, the Jammu and
Kashmir police or local administration – whose “normal”
functioning is meant to demonstrate the success of
electoral democracy and the end of war. The military
infrastructure overrides all local systems of governance;
therefore, to understand the forms of Indian control of
Jammu and Kashmir, it is imperative to understand the
myriad ways in which the military dominates civilian life.
Another practice that the case studies illustrate is the
manner in which the armed forces used aliases in their
operations. Invariably, they use common Kashmir Muslim
names when they operate amongst civilians. While not
illegal per se, this presents a unique challenge for
researchers, journalists, and activists who wish to detail
the covert or illegal operations of the State. While the
army would claim this to be an integral part of counterinsurgency,
there is no doubt that it also allowed for, and
continues to allow for, criminality with little consequence.
In a clear attempt to disguise the true perpetrators of
violence, the operatives of the Indian state hide their
identities behind local names.
Methodology
This chapter is based on numerous eld visits to two
areas, Pattan and Islamabad, where testimonies were
collected and subsequently analyzed. In addition, every
effort has been made to acquire ofcial information
through the ling of numerous RTIs. But, the Government
of Jammu and Kashmir refused to provide information on
certain RTI requests. For example, in the specic case
studies of Islamabad and Pattan, an RTI was led to the
Jammu and Kashmir Police seeking information on all
FIRs led in specic, listed police stations in these two
areas but no information has been provided to date.
The form of information/stories collated and presented in
this report have circulated amongst locals and even
journalists for years now, but this report is the rst attempt
to systematize such information by interviewing multiple
sources and correlating their accounts [whenever that is
feasible.] So the point, in addition to laying out the
structure of the forces in operation, is to create a database
of witness testimonies that will not only leave a record for
the future but which can be mined by any investigative
bodies.
The researchers were also confronted with important
ethical issues in the preparation of this report. In an active
conict, for us to visit communities and ask pointed
questions about the causes and effects of violence risked
repeating some of the coercive interrogation people
already suffer. Further, those members of these
communities who have been forced by the armed forces
into performing acts of surveillance, betrayal or indeed
violence are compromised by any investigation of
violence. Researchers feared that their questions would
prompt an examination of the past that could lead to
further discord within communities that had been divided
badly in the past. We therefore worked very hard to ask all
questions sensitively and have respected the wishes of
those who wished to speak to us anonymously.
Finally, while cogent and credible evidence is presented in
this chapter, we hold that there is a need for independent
and impartial investigations on all allegations and
evidence presented in this chapter.
Notes on nomenclature- The government continues to
use the name Anantnag in all its documents, but people
who live there [or elsewhere] refuse to call the town
anything but Islamabad, the traditional and popular name.
We have therefore decided to use the name Islamabad for
both the town and the district ofcially known as
Anantnag. Across interviews in Pattan, the people
remember and refer to the “Hyderbaig” camp as the
Brigade/Sector Headquarters. In fact, the Brigade/Sector
Headquarters was and is [in the case of Sector only] at