STRUCTURES OF VIOLENCE
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39<br />
| Structures of Violence<br />
had been detained in Palhallan army camp. He also<br />
refers to the formation of a “Peace Committee” that<br />
functioned from 1994 to around 1998under the<br />
Chairmanship of Abdul Khaliq Bhat, which was<br />
approved by the army and apparently formed in<br />
consultation with them. This committee was to intervene<br />
and assist in release of civilians picked up by the army.<br />
The creation of this body indicates the extent to which<br />
normal systems of power – the police being the most<br />
obvious in addition to the administrative systems – had<br />
been superseded. The army was the primary authority<br />
and civilians, under guidance from army ofcers, had to<br />
nd ways and means to assist themselves.<br />
Witness B [Testimony No.4] states that in the time that he<br />
was functional as an MM operative, and immediately<br />
prior, the government militia commanders, working for<br />
the Indian army, were: Mohammad Ramzan Mian, alias<br />
Hayat Khan, resident of Pattan, Azam Khan, resident of<br />
Hokar, Badasgam, Achabal, Islamabad District,<br />
Shaheen, resident of Nihalpora, Pattan, and nally,<br />
Ghulam Ahmad Waza, alias Amma Waza, resident of<br />
Palhallan. Each of the commanders succeeded the<br />
predecessor once they were killed. Witness B joined the<br />
MM and began working for the army during the tenure of<br />
Azam Khan.<br />
The most precise and clear testimony of the arming of<br />
the government gunmen is that of Witness B. He states<br />
that weapons and ammunition were provided to them<br />
directly by the army. The weapons were provided by the<br />
Palhallan camp. A Company Havaldar Major [CHM] was<br />
in charge of maintaining a register. All weapons<br />
provided, and there was no quota or limitation, were to<br />
be accounted for in the register. All weapons and<br />
ammunition returned were also accounted for similarly.<br />
The witness himself never approached or went to the<br />
Hyderbaig camp. However, he states that commanders<br />
and senior gunmen did go to the Hyderbaig camp. Only<br />
they could deal with the senior ofcers at the Hyderbaig<br />
camp, such as Lt. Colonel Choudhary. Further, as stated<br />
above, Noor-ud-din conrms that Hayat Khan would<br />
receive weapons and ammunition directly from the<br />
Hyderbaig camp. Witness C states that the army used to<br />
supply the MM weapons even in Chaksari. He states that<br />
even Mohammad Yousuf Dar, brother of Ahsan Dar, was<br />
being armed by the army openly. The testimony of<br />
Witness D varies from Witness C to the extent that he<br />
states, only ammunition was received from the army and<br />
the weapons with the MM were those that they received<br />
earlier when they were militants. He states that<br />
ammunition was received from the Chaksari camp [as<br />
he was part of the Chaksari MM]. He states that<br />
Commander Athar would get the ammunition and then<br />
distribute it. He himself never met the Major and<br />
received the ammunition. Ghulam Hassan Bhat, alias<br />
Hass Kaloo, resident of Buran, Pattan, Testimony no.12,<br />
and working for Hayat Khan also conrms that<br />
ammunition was received from the army. Once again, he<br />
states he never received it directly from the army camp.<br />
He also suggests an understanding between the various<br />
MM groups as he states that when Hayat Khan's group<br />
did not have ammunition they could sometimes also get<br />
it from Athar's group of MM at Chaksari.<br />
Both Witness B and Noor-ud-Din state that the regular<br />
Jammu and Kashmir police could not, and did not,<br />
interfere with the government gunmen and their<br />
operations. This extended all the way to the<br />
Superintendent of Police [SP] level. Witness B goes as<br />
far as to state that they would not even listen to the<br />
police. But, the SOG, as evidenced by the role of DSP<br />
Kuldeep and ASI Surjeet, did run the government<br />
gunmen as well and were responsible for widespread<br />
human rights violations.<br />
The role—rather the lack of a role—of the police has also<br />
been mentioned by Dr. Abdul Ahad Yatoo, resident of<br />
Hyderbaig, Pattan. Abdul Ahad Yatoo refers to himself<br />
as a social worker, and has fought elections, as detailed<br />
in his testimony [Testimony no.9]. As a person involved<br />
in the electoral process this witness would necessarily<br />
have an intimate understanding of the power, inuence<br />
and control of the army in Palhallan. Abdul Ahad Yatoo<br />
stated that he had assisted in saving thousands of<br />
civilians detained by the army. While this claim and the<br />
surrounding circumstances are contested, there is little<br />
disagreement about the access Abdul Ahad Yatoo had to<br />
the army. Therefore, his testimony is compelling. He<br />
states that the Jammu and Kashmir police had no power<br />
to supersede the decisions of the army. They could<br />
“request” the army – for example to release a person<br />
detained – but the power lay with the army.<br />
“Captain” Abdul Aziz Bhat [Testimony No.5], states that<br />
the army, because of the circumstances, was in control<br />
till the late 1990s and it was only subsequent to that that<br />
the police was given a role. The Superintendents of<br />
Police did not have a role and they were limited to their<br />
ofces. This is also the reason why when his sons were<br />
abducted in December 1996 by the soldiers of Palhallan<br />
army camp, he chose not to approach a senior police<br />
ofcial, Satnam Singh, who was his friend. Instead, he<br />
approached the army directly.<br />
Witness D [Testimony no.11], also states very clearly<br />
that the police had no role and could not control the MM.<br />
Further, he states that even the SOG did not follow<br />
orders from the regular police at the Pattan police<br />
station. This lack of power of the policemen stationed at<br />
Pattan is also conrmed by Witness B. Ghulam Hassan<br />
Bhat, alias Hass Kaloo, who states that, based on his<br />
numerous visits to the Palhallan army camp he believes<br />
that the army was supreme and the police subordinate to<br />
them.<br />
The above testimony of Abdul Ahad Yatoo of the power<br />
of the army is further buttressed by a claim that he makes<br />
that requires corroboration. But even uncorroborated it<br />
still is telling about the control exercised by army ofcers.<br />
He states that in 1994 or 1995 he approached the<br />
Commanding Ofcer – who commanded the Gharwal<br />
Ries – and requested him not to allow the “ikhwan” [a<br />
reference to government gunmen] to function in the<br />
Pattan area as the town was peaceful. He states that the<br />
Commanding Ofcer accepted his request and the<br />
Ikhwan was in fact denied access to Pattan town.<br />
Another illustration that displays the control the army<br />
held over the government gunmen is available in the<br />
testimony of Assadullah Ganie [Testimony no.21] where<br />
he states that the government gunmen who kidnapped<br />
his daughter ultimately surrendered before Major S.K.<br />
Sharma, at Hyderbaig camp at Zorawar cinema, despite<br />
the presence of police and other authorities to whom<br />
they might have earlier surrendered.<br />
Joint Operations<br />
The clearest evidence of the structure of violence in<br />
Pattan emanates from the witness testimony of raids,