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STRUCTURES OF VIOLENCE

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39<br />

| Structures of Violence<br />

had been detained in Palhallan army camp. He also<br />

refers to the formation of a “Peace Committee” that<br />

functioned from 1994 to around 1998under the<br />

Chairmanship of Abdul Khaliq Bhat, which was<br />

approved by the army and apparently formed in<br />

consultation with them. This committee was to intervene<br />

and assist in release of civilians picked up by the army.<br />

The creation of this body indicates the extent to which<br />

normal systems of power – the police being the most<br />

obvious in addition to the administrative systems – had<br />

been superseded. The army was the primary authority<br />

and civilians, under guidance from army ofcers, had to<br />

nd ways and means to assist themselves.<br />

Witness B [Testimony No.4] states that in the time that he<br />

was functional as an MM operative, and immediately<br />

prior, the government militia commanders, working for<br />

the Indian army, were: Mohammad Ramzan Mian, alias<br />

Hayat Khan, resident of Pattan, Azam Khan, resident of<br />

Hokar, Badasgam, Achabal, Islamabad District,<br />

Shaheen, resident of Nihalpora, Pattan, and nally,<br />

Ghulam Ahmad Waza, alias Amma Waza, resident of<br />

Palhallan. Each of the commanders succeeded the<br />

predecessor once they were killed. Witness B joined the<br />

MM and began working for the army during the tenure of<br />

Azam Khan.<br />

The most precise and clear testimony of the arming of<br />

the government gunmen is that of Witness B. He states<br />

that weapons and ammunition were provided to them<br />

directly by the army. The weapons were provided by the<br />

Palhallan camp. A Company Havaldar Major [CHM] was<br />

in charge of maintaining a register. All weapons<br />

provided, and there was no quota or limitation, were to<br />

be accounted for in the register. All weapons and<br />

ammunition returned were also accounted for similarly.<br />

The witness himself never approached or went to the<br />

Hyderbaig camp. However, he states that commanders<br />

and senior gunmen did go to the Hyderbaig camp. Only<br />

they could deal with the senior ofcers at the Hyderbaig<br />

camp, such as Lt. Colonel Choudhary. Further, as stated<br />

above, Noor-ud-din conrms that Hayat Khan would<br />

receive weapons and ammunition directly from the<br />

Hyderbaig camp. Witness C states that the army used to<br />

supply the MM weapons even in Chaksari. He states that<br />

even Mohammad Yousuf Dar, brother of Ahsan Dar, was<br />

being armed by the army openly. The testimony of<br />

Witness D varies from Witness C to the extent that he<br />

states, only ammunition was received from the army and<br />

the weapons with the MM were those that they received<br />

earlier when they were militants. He states that<br />

ammunition was received from the Chaksari camp [as<br />

he was part of the Chaksari MM]. He states that<br />

Commander Athar would get the ammunition and then<br />

distribute it. He himself never met the Major and<br />

received the ammunition. Ghulam Hassan Bhat, alias<br />

Hass Kaloo, resident of Buran, Pattan, Testimony no.12,<br />

and working for Hayat Khan also conrms that<br />

ammunition was received from the army. Once again, he<br />

states he never received it directly from the army camp.<br />

He also suggests an understanding between the various<br />

MM groups as he states that when Hayat Khan's group<br />

did not have ammunition they could sometimes also get<br />

it from Athar's group of MM at Chaksari.<br />

Both Witness B and Noor-ud-Din state that the regular<br />

Jammu and Kashmir police could not, and did not,<br />

interfere with the government gunmen and their<br />

operations. This extended all the way to the<br />

Superintendent of Police [SP] level. Witness B goes as<br />

far as to state that they would not even listen to the<br />

police. But, the SOG, as evidenced by the role of DSP<br />

Kuldeep and ASI Surjeet, did run the government<br />

gunmen as well and were responsible for widespread<br />

human rights violations.<br />

The role—rather the lack of a role—of the police has also<br />

been mentioned by Dr. Abdul Ahad Yatoo, resident of<br />

Hyderbaig, Pattan. Abdul Ahad Yatoo refers to himself<br />

as a social worker, and has fought elections, as detailed<br />

in his testimony [Testimony no.9]. As a person involved<br />

in the electoral process this witness would necessarily<br />

have an intimate understanding of the power, inuence<br />

and control of the army in Palhallan. Abdul Ahad Yatoo<br />

stated that he had assisted in saving thousands of<br />

civilians detained by the army. While this claim and the<br />

surrounding circumstances are contested, there is little<br />

disagreement about the access Abdul Ahad Yatoo had to<br />

the army. Therefore, his testimony is compelling. He<br />

states that the Jammu and Kashmir police had no power<br />

to supersede the decisions of the army. They could<br />

“request” the army – for example to release a person<br />

detained – but the power lay with the army.<br />

“Captain” Abdul Aziz Bhat [Testimony No.5], states that<br />

the army, because of the circumstances, was in control<br />

till the late 1990s and it was only subsequent to that that<br />

the police was given a role. The Superintendents of<br />

Police did not have a role and they were limited to their<br />

ofces. This is also the reason why when his sons were<br />

abducted in December 1996 by the soldiers of Palhallan<br />

army camp, he chose not to approach a senior police<br />

ofcial, Satnam Singh, who was his friend. Instead, he<br />

approached the army directly.<br />

Witness D [Testimony no.11], also states very clearly<br />

that the police had no role and could not control the MM.<br />

Further, he states that even the SOG did not follow<br />

orders from the regular police at the Pattan police<br />

station. This lack of power of the policemen stationed at<br />

Pattan is also conrmed by Witness B. Ghulam Hassan<br />

Bhat, alias Hass Kaloo, who states that, based on his<br />

numerous visits to the Palhallan army camp he believes<br />

that the army was supreme and the police subordinate to<br />

them.<br />

The above testimony of Abdul Ahad Yatoo of the power<br />

of the army is further buttressed by a claim that he makes<br />

that requires corroboration. But even uncorroborated it<br />

still is telling about the control exercised by army ofcers.<br />

He states that in 1994 or 1995 he approached the<br />

Commanding Ofcer – who commanded the Gharwal<br />

Ries – and requested him not to allow the “ikhwan” [a<br />

reference to government gunmen] to function in the<br />

Pattan area as the town was peaceful. He states that the<br />

Commanding Ofcer accepted his request and the<br />

Ikhwan was in fact denied access to Pattan town.<br />

Another illustration that displays the control the army<br />

held over the government gunmen is available in the<br />

testimony of Assadullah Ganie [Testimony no.21] where<br />

he states that the government gunmen who kidnapped<br />

his daughter ultimately surrendered before Major S.K.<br />

Sharma, at Hyderbaig camp at Zorawar cinema, despite<br />

the presence of police and other authorities to whom<br />

they might have earlier surrendered.<br />

Joint Operations<br />

The clearest evidence of the structure of violence in<br />

Pattan emanates from the witness testimony of raids,

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