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asia policy
In addition to population and territory, what also underlies and amplifies
South Korea’s power dilemma is China’s economic and military power,
which has grown apace over the past decades. For instance, in 2013 China’s
economy ($9.240 trillion) was approximately seven times the size of South
Korea’s ($1.304 trillion) in terms of GDP. 6 Although South Korea spends more
on its military as a percentage of GDP, it still trails China in total military
spending. China’s defense budget was $112.2 billion in 2013, whereas South
Korea’s defense budget was only $31.8 billion. 7 Furthermore, China’s military
accommodates a greater number of troops than any other country in the world
at close to 2.3 million strong in 2012. 8 Such gaps in sheer power undoubtedly
make South Korea vulnerable to China’s economic influence and potential
military aggression. South Korea’s insecurity may also derive from its political
and ideological differences with China. Dissonant value systems can breed
insecurity and suspicion between democracies and illiberal regimes that
share a common border. Political scientist Michael Doyle attributes this to the
“perception by liberal states that non-liberal states are in a permanent state
of aggression against their own people.” 9 South Korea—seen as a successful
democracy—cannot but feel uncertain about the implications of the rise of a
mammoth Communist state in its neighborhood.
Above all, China’s global rise deepens South Korea’s power dilemma. To
South Koreans, China’s rise augurs a resurgence of Sinocentric hierarchical
order. In light of their country’s own historical experiences as a tributary
state to old Chinese dynasties, and also given Beijing’s increasingly assertive
behavior and willingness to project its newfound power, South Koreans are
naturally wary and anxious about China’s rise. 10 Such apprehension surfaced
in 2004 when China claimed ancient Korea’s Koguryo kingdom as part of
Chinese provincial history, which immediately invited strong rebukes
from South Koreans. Some argued that the action showed “hegemonic
6 “GDP (Current US$),” World Bank, World Development Indicators u http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
7 “The Military Balance 2014 Press Statement,” International Institute for Strategic Studies,
February 5, 2014 u http://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20
releases/archive/2014-dd03/february-0abc/military-balance-2014-press-statement-52d7.
8 Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2012 Defense White Paper (Seoul, 2012), 350–53 u http://
www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201308140915094310.pdf.
9 Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2,” Philosophy and Public Affairs
12, no. 3 (1983): 325–26.
10 Chung, Between Ally and Partner, 101.
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