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asia policy the news media’s eagerness to mete out positive results even before the two sides had announced their formal agreements. This article is an empirical rebuttal to the mostly anecdotal and largely impressionistic views in some corners of the United States and Japan that South Korea is already in the Chinese orbit. The article is organized as follows: u u u pp. 126–29 offer an assessment of the Xi visit in July 2014 as a key indicator of South Korea’s policies toward China. pp. 130–43 examine South Koreans’ perceptions of China in seven issue domains, arguing that these are not quite congruent with the thesis that Seoul is in China’s orbit. pp. 143–45 look into the more recent case of President Park’s attendance of China’s Victory Day celebration in September 2015 and provide some informed predictions about South Korea’s future relations with China. an assessment of the xi visit in 2014 Twenty-three years after the normalization of diplomatic ties, ROK-China relations have entered into a period of maturation. With a history of ebbs and flows, 3 bilateral ties were particularly bumpy during 2008–12 due not only to the Lee Myung-bak administration’s largely pro-U.S. approach but also to Beijing’s defense of North Korea’s sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. When the Xi and Park administrations were inaugurated in 2012 and 2013, respectively, an improvement in the bilateral relationship was highly anticipated. Four factors have played a role in facilitating better relations between Seoul and Beijing since 2013. First, as if to accommodate such high expectations, the Xi administration has put much effort into wooing Seoul, often at the expense of Pyongyang. 4 Second, the Park government found that it was rather difficult to distinguish itself from the previous administration in the relationship with the United States and regarded improving relations with China as a diplomatic blue ocean. Third, as a result of the bizarre behavior of the Kim Jong-un regime, Beijing came to realize that Pyongyang could become a serious political liability for China’s reputation as a “responsible great power.” Fourth, President Park’s visit to China in 2013—officially 3 Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 4 Several South Korean officials interviewed by the authors referred to Beijing’s recent approach as a “charm offensive.” [ 126 ]
chung and kim • is south korea in china’s orbit? promoted as a “trip for heart-to-heart building of trust” (xinxin zhi lü)—was such a big hit in China that it had the effect of further cementing bilateral ties. Many analysts thus expected President Xi’s state visit to South Korea in July 2014 to lead to another heyday for ROK-China relations. As the saying goes, summits rarely fail. Although the outcomes of the Park-Xi summit did not exactly meet these inflated expectations, a couple of developments merit special attention. The decision to start official negotiations in 2015 regarding the demarcation of maritime boundaries, including exclusive economic zones (EEZ), was a huge step forward. For one, successful win-win negotiations on this sensitive issue would eliminate for good a principal obstacle to stable ROK-China relations. In addition, given that maritime territorial disputes have long constituted a principal source of contention in East Asia, agreement by Seoul and Beijing on a mutually satisfying solution could set a useful model for crisis prevention and confidence building with far-reaching ramifications for the region. As for the areas of bilateral cooperation, three were specified—reduction of air pollution, collective rescue operations in cases of accidents and natural calamities, and increased cooperation in public health—with specific modes of operation and cooperation to be delineated. 5 In the realm of economic cooperation, the two sides set the target of reaching an agreement on a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) before the end of 2014. Thanks to the leaders’ close attention to this issue, the Korea-China FTA was subsequently signed on November 10, 2014, and is now waiting to be formally ratified. Other noteworthy outcomes of the summit included establishing an offshore yuan center in Seoul (the first one in Asia outside the greater China region) and granting South Korea an 80 billion renminbi quota for domestic investors to buy Chinese securities under the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor program. 6 Nevertheless, a big picture for economic cooperation over the next five to ten years was apparently missing. With regard to areas for regional and global cooperation, which are now deemed a key domain of the strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries, three issues were highlighted—climate change, cybersecurity, 5 The following discussion is based on the joint statements announced after the 2014 Park-Xi summit. For the joint statement, see “Pakdaetonglyeong-Sijuseog chaetaeg Hanjung gongdongseongmyeong jeonmun” [President Park-Premier Xi Sino-Korean Joint Statement Text], Yonhap News Agency, July 30, 2014 u http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2014/07/03/0501000 000AKR20140703143800001.HTML. 6 See Jung-Hoon Kim, “Xi Jinping banghan” [Specials on Xi Jinping’s Visit], Chosun Daily, July 4, 2014; and Special Report, “Hanguk gyungje yong eui deung’e olatada” [South Korea’s Economy Riding with the Dragon], JoongAng Daily, November 11, 2014. [ 127 ]
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is south korea in china’s orbit?
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