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asia policy
be cautious not to offend China. This was immediately put to rest, with the
new leader publicly describing China’s behavior in the South China Sea
as undermining Chinese interests and advocating a strategy combining
diplomacy with “balancing.” 18 Such rhetoric, combined with revelations
about Australia’s sustained assertion of rights of overflight, suggests
that Canberra will continue to support international efforts to manage
tensions in a critical part of the regional and global commons. In parallel
with anticipated future U.S. freedom of navigation operations, continued
Australian air force surveillance will help neutralize the strategic and
diplomatic value of China’s island-building.
Australia’s further options are limited but could include exploring
creative, oblique ways to point out to China that island-building and
coercion are harmful to its interests. For instance, Australia could step
up its activism in convening new bilateral security partnerships or even
minilateral security dialogues with countries concerned about the way
China is using its power. Such initiatives would signal to China that its
behavior is bringing about the very outcome it does not want—a firmer
balancing alignment of other regional powers. Another option is bilateral
diplomacy, with Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop’s firm opposition
to China’s destabilizing declaration of an air defense identification zone over
waters contested with Japan in 2013 providing an important precedent. 19
In that instance, Australia weathered China’s diplomatic displeasure,
an experience that has arguably strengthened Australia’s resolve and
self-respect in handling differences with its largest trading partner. 20
A looming test of Australia’s priorities will come with how it responds to
the determination, due in early 2016, of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
in The Hague on the case that the Philippines has brought against China
over their competing territorial claims. Despite its repeated endorsement
of a rules-based approach to the security problems in the South China Sea,
Canberra has been less than outspoken in praising Manila’s initiative to
appeal to the umpire. It appears this is not purely or even primarily about
mollifying China. Rather, the issue is that Australia itself has previously
18 John Garnaut, “Malcolm Turnbull Changes Direction on Foreign Policy: China Trumps the Islamic
State Death Cult,” Age, September 24, 2015.
19 “Angry China Rebukes Julie Bishop over East China Sea Dispute,” Australian, December 7, 2013.
20 For further discussion of these options, see Rory Medcalf, “The Temperature in Canberra as the South
China Sea Boils,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,
June 4, 2015 u http://amti.csis.org/the-temperature-in-canberra-as-the-south-china-sea-boils.
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