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asia policy impressive. Although this trend is certainly welcome for Sino–South Korean relations, the fundamental question remains of how sustainable or durable it is. As these surveys show, public sentiments and perceptions are by definition fickle and, therefore, assessing them more concretely in a couple of principal issue-areas is deemed necessary. China as an Economic Partner or Competitor Once regarded as a factory for the world with its cheap labor, China has been fast transforming and upgrading its industrial structure, thereby enhancing its economic competitiveness. Accordingly, in the eyes of the South Korean public, China is increasingly seen as a source of tough competition and even a growing economic threat. A poll conducted in 2006 found that 58.5% of respondents considered China as a market with ample business opportunities, whereas 40.8% viewed the country as an economic threat (see Table 3). 27 By 2012, the mainstream South Korean view had changed, as 52.7% now saw China’s economic growth as a threat to the Korean economy. This trend persisted in 2014, with 71.9% of South Koreans viewing China’s economic rise as threatening. 28 Two reasons largely account for the growing view of China’s rise as an economic threat. For one, the fear of China’s economic rise stems from South Korea’s high level of trade dependence on China. While the level of TABLE 3 South Koreans’ Perceptions of China’s Economic Rise (%) 2006 2012 2014 Threat 40.8 52.7 71.9 Not a threat 58.5 43.5 18.7 Source: East Asia Institute, JoongAng Daily, and Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Public Opinion Survey on Foreign Relations, 2006; Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Asan Annual Survey, 2012; and Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Asan Daily Poll, May 7–9, 2014. 27 East Asia Institute, JoongAng Daily, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Public Opinion Survey on Foreign Relations, 2006 u http://www.eai.or.kr/type/p2.asp?catcode=1410101100. Data is available upon request. 28 Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Asan Annual Survey, 2012; and Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Asan Daily Poll, May 7–9, 2014. See also Jiyoon Kim, Karl Friedhoff, Chungku Kang, and Euicheol Lee, Asan Report: South Korean Attitudes on China (Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies, July 2014) u http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-korean-attitudes-on-china. [ 134 ]
chung and kim • is south korea in china’s orbit? trade dependence of the two countries on each other was fairly similar up to the mid-1990s, China’s volume of trade grew explosively thereafter, steeply increasing South Korea’s trade dependence on China (see Table 4). As of 2013, South Korea’s dependence on China was 3.8 times that of China’s on South Korea. South Koreans are in part concerned that Beijing could utilize this trade dependence as diplomatic leverage. South Koreans also feel threatened by the rapidly narrowing technological gap between South Korea and China. In an Asan Daily Poll conducted in May 2014, 43.6% of respondents referred to this factor as an important reason for their wariness of China’s rise. 29 The relative technological indices for Seoul and Beijing were 83.9 and 71.4, respectively, in 2013, compared with 76.3 and 58.5 in 2010 (the United States has a standard value of 100). South Korea has also been less competitive than China on the world market. In 2012, for instance, China produced 1,495 products ranked number one, while South Korea only produced 64. 30 Despite these concerns, South Koreans were fairly sanguine about reaching an FTA with China. Whereas in 2012 46.5% of respondents supported an FTA, while 39.0% opposed it, by 2014 the percentage of those supporting an FTA had TABLE 4 Mutual Trade Dependence of South Korea and China (%) Year South Korea’s dependence on China China’s dependence on South Korea 1990 2.8 3.3 1995 6.4 5.9 2000 9.4 6.6 2007 19.9 8.9 2013 21.0 5.5 Source: Korea International Traders Association u http://www.kita.net, calculated with data from Zhongguo tongji nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook] (Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of China, pertinent years). 29 Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Asan Daily Poll, May 7–9, 2014. 30 See JoongAng Daily, July 9, 2014. For further analysis of South Koreans’ concerns with the massive inflow of Chinese capital, see “Haewundae ggaji Jung jabon milmul” [A Tidal Wave of Chinese Capital into Korea], Chosun Daily, October 3, 2014. [ 135 ]
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the national bureau of asian resear
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asia policy number 21 • january 2
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is south korea in china’s orbit?
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2) To help bridge the policy and ac
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oundtable • non-claimant perspect
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