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asia policy Beijing while at the same time managing its allies’ and partners’ perceptions to avoid potential pitfalls down the road. The Entrapment Dilemma South Korea’s strategies toward China also need to address the entrapment dilemma, which largely stems from the notion that South Korea cannot afford to isolate China even as it remains allied with the United States. South Korea never wants to be in a situation where it will be caught between U.S. and Chinese interests. Nowhere is this fear of entrapment more evident than in debates about strategic flexibility. South Korea is extremely reluctant to allow U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula to be used for contingencies in the region, especially regarding China. This issue came to a head in the early 2000s when the United States pushed for an explicit commitment, which South Korea was unwilling to give. Even as it remains a U.S. treaty ally, Seoul’s worst nightmare is to be forced to choose between Beijing and Washington. To avoid this entrapment dilemma, South Korea’s China strategies retain the U.S.-ROK alliance as a core component, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm. South Korean presidents historically have dealt with the entrapment dilemma in one of two ways. One way is by playing a balancing role between the two powers. This strategy operates on the premise that South Korea cannot afford to choose between the United States and China and therefore will seek to position itself between the two, at times siding with the United States and at other times with China. This view retains the U.S. alliance but puts some distance between Seoul and Washington in order for South Korea to be a credible partner to China. This view was formally pronounced and upheld by the late South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun, who in 2005 asserted that South Korea could be a “balancer in Northeast Asia.” As simple as the concept may have sounded, it was not easy to implement, and the policy generated negative perceptions in Washington among pro-alliance constituents that South Korea was tilting away from the United States. The second strategy is what might be termed “alliance-plus” and is based on the view that South Korea’s relationship with China and the United States need not be a zero-sum game. This strategy rests on an underlying assumption that despite political sensitivities, differences, and the competing natures of these relationships, there are converging areas of interest where both the U.S.-ROK alliance and the PRC-ROK strategic partnership can operate to achieve mutual benefits and greater public goods. This strategy also encompasses the view that there are alternative ways to look at relations with [ 112 ]
kim and cha • between a rock and a hard place China beyond the friend-threat dichotomy. Supporters of this view claim that South Korea’s alliance with the United States and partnership with China are not mutually exclusive; to the contrary, a deep alliance with the United States actually strengthens South Korea’s position as it deals with China. 29 Indeed, one high-level South Korean official privately noted this by saying, “If we have a poor relationship with the U.S., China treats us like a province, but if we have a good relationship, then they treat us with respect.” 30 The Park administration’s China strategy reflects a delicate balance of the two strategies described above. This was previously demonstrated in January 2013 when President Park, then the president-elect, made an active overture to China by sending her first diplomatic envoy to Beijing instead of the traditional choice of Washington. 31 Unlike her predecessors, who often went to Japan for their second trip abroad after the United States, President Park chose to return to China to show her resolve to improve relations. This series of unusual diplomatic moves by the Park administration was welcomed in Beijing and led to a reciprocal state visit by President Xi in July 2014. But President Park’s overtures to Beijing were carefully managed with regard to Washington. In May 2013, she made her first overseas trip to Washington, D.C., to hold a summit with President Barack Obama, demonstrating that South Korea’s center of gravity in its foreign relations remains the alliance with the United States. In addition to celebrating the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-ROK alliance, President Obama publicly supported President Park’s Korean Peninsula trust-building initiative, and President Park was given the honor of addressing a joint session of Congress, all of which shows the strength of bilateral ties. In spring 2015, however, the Park government faced a risk of entrapment between the United States and China over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and issues surrounding Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Amid heightened tensions, a flurry of visits to Seoul by high-ranking government officials in March–April 2015, beginning with Chinese assistant minister of foreign affairs Liu Jianchao, U.S. assistant secretary of state Daniel Russel, and U.S. secretary of defense Ashton Carter, was seen in Seoul as a “tug of war” between the United States and 29 “Dongbug-asin jilseoleul malhada: ‘Hanmi meol-eojimyeon…Jung, ohilyeo Hangug-eul gyeongsihal geos’ ” [Speaking of a Northeast Asian Order: “If the U.S.-ROK Alliance Weakens, China Will Not Take South Korea Seriously”], Chosun Ilbo, July 18, 2014 u http://news.chosun. com/site/data/html_dir/2014/07/18/2014071800344.html. 30 Author’s private meeting with senior Korean official, Seoul, South Korea. 31 Lee Ji-seon, “Park Sends First Envoy to China,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 17, 2013 u http://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=201301171445397&code=710100. [ 113 ]
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asia policy number 21 • january 2
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is south korea in china’s orbit?
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2) To help bridge the policy and ac
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